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THE ABA, THE RULES, AND
PROFESSIONALISM: THE MECHANICS OF
SELF-DEFEAT AND A CALL FOR A RETURN
TO THE ETHICAL, MORAL, AND PRACTICAL
APPROACH OF THE CANONS
BENJAMIN H. BARTON*
The legal profession has seen multiple efforts on the part of lawyer
regulators to confront what is seen as a "crisis" of professionalism
among lawyers. This Article argues that despite the sincerity of
these efforts, they have failed largely because the profession has
divided what was once the single unifying goal for bar associations
and lawyer regulators-providing moral, ethical, and practical
guidance on how to practice law-into two quite distinct, and in
some ways contradictory goals, thus undercutting the entire project.
The original, unified goal, best embodied by the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics, provided both general moral and ethical advice
and specific practical advice to lawyers. This unified statement was
split first by the adoption of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, which separated the general considerations from the
mandatory minimums, and then by the adoption of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, which eliminated the broadly moral
altogether. Now there are two distinct goals. The drafters have
largely eliminated the broad, philosophical standards from the
Canons of Professional Ethics and Code of Professional
Responsibility, have sharpened the minimums into a quasi-criminal
set of rules, and have increasingly focused on the minimum
standards of lawyer conduct. These efforts are referred to as the
"minimalist" project. At the same time, bar associations and
attorney regulators have felt a backlash from the legalization of
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what was once accurately termed "legal ethics," and have attempted
to raise the ethical consciousness of the profession as a whole
through hortatory, non-binding efforts. These efforts are known as
the "broadly ethical" project.
This Article argues that the goals of the "minimalist" project and
the "broadly ethical" project conflict and undercut each other in
several important ways. Further, this Article provides a simple but
heretical solution: redraft the Canons with a single goal in mind-
giving moral, ethical, and practical guidelines for the practice of
law. This will reunite the broad and narrow goals of legal ethics,
will give some needed meaning and attention to the "broadly
ethical" project, will fundamentally change the way lawyers
approach their minimalist duties, and will make the minimums
more explicitly ethical, moral, and naturally followed.
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INTRODUCTION
Any hardened observer of modern lawyer regulation cannot
avoid the overwhelming sensation of churning. For years now the
legal profession,' the judiciary,2 the academy,3 and bar associations4
have decried a "crisis" in the profession and have proposed various
1. Bar journals and practitioner publications regularly feature articles decrying a
crisis in professionalism and offering various prescriptions for reform. See, e.g., Elliot L.
Bien, Toward a Community of Professionalism, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 475, 478
(2001) (stating that "[m]any judges and lawyers in the United States believe there has
been a serious decline of professionalism in the conduct of litigation" and arguing for a
closer American emulation of Britain's barristers); Sean P. Ravenel, The Contagion of
Example, FED. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 31 (noting that "[tihere is no question that a
crisis in professionalism exists within the legal community" and suggesting various law
school reforms); Jill Sundby, McShane's Helping Montana Lawyers Tune up Their Lives'
Anthems, MONT. LAW., Oct. 2000, at 18 (describing strategies for stress relief in light of
"crisis" in legal profession).
2. Probably the best known example of the judicial reaction to a perceived
professionalism crisis is THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, A NATIONAL ACTION
PLAN ON LAWYER CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM (1999) [hereinafter JUSTICES
ACTION PLAN].
3. Scholarly references to the "professionalism crisis" have become so common that
Professor W. Bradley Wendel has described "a burgeoning genre-the 'profession in
crisis' jeremiad." See W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional Responsibility,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (1999). For a comprehensive overview of the most common
complaints, see MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS
IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 17-108 (1994);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 1-48 (2000) [hereinafter RHODE, INTERESTS].
4. The American Bar Association ("ABA") has led the bar association charge, see,
e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT
OF PUBLIC SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER
PROFESSIONALISM 3, 12-54 (1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 253-54, 263-304 (1986)
[hereinafter BLUEPRINT] (identifying a decline in lawyer professionalism and suggesting
various solutions to help remedy the problem), but other bar associations have been
heavily involved. Consider, for example, the New Jersey Commission on Professionalism,
"a unique cooperative venture of the NJSBA, the state and federal judiciary, and New
Jersey's three law schools," see NEW JERSEY COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM,
Background, at http://www.njsba.com/commission-onprof/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2004), or
the professionalism creed of the Dallas Bar Association, which has been reprinted in
Dondi Prop. Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 292-95 (N.D. Tex.
1988) (describing Dallas Bar Association's Guidelines for Professional Courtesy and
professionalism creed, and adopting them as standing orders for Northern District of
Texas).
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solutions, ranging from hortatory to regulatory. For the last twenty
years these reform efforts have proceeded along two tracks:
increasing "professionalism"5 and revising and recalibrating the
regulations governing the minimum standards of attorney conduct.
6
Despite the prevalence of the terms "crisis" and
"professionalism" in these reform efforts, neither term is particularly
well defined. There are actually at least four related but distinct
crises listed in these various accounts of the Job-like woes of the legal
profession. First, many lament the public's low opinion of the legal
profession.7 Second, others concern themselves with the unhappy and
unhealthy nature of the legal profession itself.8 Third, many bemoan
the loss of "professionalism" amongst lawyers.9 Last, some fret over
5. Consider, for example, the ABA's extensive national listing of professionalism
codes. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, Professionalism Codes, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/profcodes.html
(last visited Sept. 15, 2004) [hereinafter CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY]
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
6. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr; ABA Center for Professional
Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Commission, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html
(describing efforts of the ABA's Ethics 2000 initiative to amend the Model Rules) (last
visited Sept. 15, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
7. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public
Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805, 808-24 (1998) (using
survey data and lawyer jokes to show lawyer unpopularity and discussing the historical
decline of lawyers' reputation); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Legal Profession and the Public
Image of Lawyers, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 51 (1999) (using lawyer jokes and television
portrayals to show public dislike of the legal profession); Randall T. Shepard, Moving the
Rock: The Constant Need to Re-Invent the Profession Using the Nation's Judiciary as
Leaders, 32 IND. L. REV. 591, 591-93 (1999) (listing survey data showing shrinking
popularity of the legal profession).
8. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Krieger, What We're Not Telling Law Students-and
Lawyers-That They Really Need to Know: Some Thoughts-In-Action Toward
Revitalizing the Profession from Its Roots, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 17-34 (1998) (describing a
process whereby law students and lawyers surrender life satisfaction); Deborah L. Rhode,
The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 283, 296-97 (1998) (describing
lawyers' feelings of dissatisfaction with their profession and concern over the decline of
professionalism); Patrick J. Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 874-906 (1999)
(identifying and attempting to explain "the poor health and unhappiness" of lawyers);
Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Why Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33, 33-34
(2001) (describing unhappiness among lawyers and the causes of the condition).
9. As noted below, there is no set definition for "professionalism," either. Some of
these complaints center on perceived lawyer incivility. See, e.g., Allen K. Harris, The
Professionalism Crisis-The 'Z' Words and Other Rambo Tactics: The Conference of
Chief Justices Solution, 53 S.C. L. REV. 549, 556-58 (2002) (describing need for increased
civility as a portion of the professionalism crisis); Robert C. Josefsberg, The Topic is
Civility-You Got a Problem with That?, FLA. B.J., Jan. 1997, at 6 (stating that the lack of
civility in the legal profession is a serious issue). Others take the view that lawyers have
increasingly rejected any consideration of the broader interests of society or the justice
system, focusing on narrow client interests instead. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE
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the legal profession's alleged transformation from profession to
business."
Moreover, the term "professionalism" itself has proven abstruse.
Most agree that professionalism implies something above and beyond
the minimum behavior required under state rules of professional
conduct (often referred to as rules of "ethics")." It has proven
notoriously difficult to define what professionalism offers beyond the
minimums of legal ethics, and most scholars and bar officials have
abandoned efforts at a specific definition. 2
Thus, reformers of the legal profession have attempted to
address a shifting set of problems, crises, with a series of reforms
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 109-37 (1998) (comparing the "meaningful work" of a contextual
view of practice with the alienation of blindly representing the clients' interests).
10. See, e.g., David A. Kessler, Professional Asphyxiation: Why the Legal Profession
is Gasping for Breath, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 455, 457-65 (1997) (describing ill effects
of "commercialism" on lawyer satisfaction); Samuel J. Levine, Professionalism Without
Parochialism: Julius Henry Coheln, Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, and the Stories of Two
Sons, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1339-41 (2003) ("In recent years, legal scholars and
practitioners have engaged in a voluminous debate over the characterization of legal
practice as a business or a profession."); Wm. Reece Smith, Jr., Teaching and Learning
Professionalism, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 613, 613 (1997) (noting that "professionalism"
has been turning into "commercialism").
11. See Melissa Breger et al., Teaching Professionalism in Context: Insights from
Students, Clients, Adversaries, and Judges, 55 S.C. L. REV. 303, 306 (2003) (arguing that
"professionalism embraces the realm of ethics, but also reaches far beyond"); Nancy J.
Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in the Twenty-First Century, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV.
923, 930 (2002) (noting that the Ethics 2000 drafters considered making the "ethics code
more 'ethical'-rather than strictly legal-by incorporating some form of ...
'professionalism' concepts"); Norman E. Veasey, Transcript from Professionalism
Conference, Panel 1: Strategies for Enhancing the Accountability of Lawyers, 54 S.C. L.
REV. 897, 897 (2003) ("And of course ethics is what the lawyer must or must not do, and
professionalism is what the lawyer should do and it's a higher calling."); W. Bradley
Wendel, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Lawyer-Bashing: Some Post-
Conference Reflections, 54 S.C. L. REV. 1027, 1028-29 (2003) ("Many commentators
identify 'ethics' with a minimum standard of obligatory conduct and 'professionalism' with
what the lawyers should do, but which is not made mandatory by enforceable disciplinary
rules."). For further discussion of the linguistic sleight of hand at work with the
use/misuse of these terms, see infra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
12. Professor Deborah Rhode has long noted a "professionalism problem ... a lack of
consensus about what exactly the problem is, let alone how best to address it." Deborah
L. Rhode, Opening Remarks: Professionalism, 52 S.C. L. REV. 458, 459 (2001); see also
Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 259, 271-80 (1995) (delineating the "elusive meaning of 'professionalism' " and
arguing that there is no meaningful definition); Austin Sarat, The Profession Versus the
Public Interest: Reflections on Two Reifications, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1491, 1494 (2002)
(reviewing RHODE, INTERESTS, supra note 3) (arguing that professionalism means
different things to each lawyer depending on context). Even the ABA's Professionalism
Blueprint acknowledged that professionalism is an "elastic concept the meaning and
application of which are hard to pin down," and chose to define the legal "profession"
instead. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 4, at 261.
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based upon an indeterminate concept, professionalism. Not
surprisingly, there is a sense within the profession and academia that
much of the professionalism crusade has fallen short of the mark.
Public opinion of lawyers remains low, 3 lawyer satisfaction has not
risen, 4 the law continues its drift from profession to business, 5 and
most damningly, there is little evidence of any increase in lawyer
professionalism, however defined.16
The churning sensation arises because of the cyclical nature of
the professionalism crisis and response process: the perceived crisis
leads to regulatory responses, the responses fail to address the crisis,
and the cycle begins again with a renewed sense of frustration and
concern. This frustration and concern will likely continue unabated
because the latest reforms look an awful lot like what already has
been tried to little effect. These responses include more attention to
professionalism in law schools, 7 more voluntary and mandatory
13. The most recent survey data confirms lawyers' relatively low public standing. See
Dianne E. Lewis, Ethics, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 5, 2004, at 23 (describing a survey rating
the honesty of lawyers at the bottom of the professions with car salesmen, HMO
managers, insurance salesmen, and advertising executives).
14. For example, bar journal stories warning lawyers about their increased likelihood
of substance abuse or depression are still quite prevalent. See, e.g., Thomas Adcock,
Despite '93 Report, Substance Abuse Persists at Law Schools, N.Y. J.L., June 27, 2003, at 16
(describing continuing problem of substance abuse in law schools); Arthur D. Burger,
Dealing with a Colleague's Addiction, TEX. LAW., Feb. 16, 2004, at 31 ("Lawyers are prime
candidates for impairment, whether caused by alcoholism, drug abuse, depression or some
other mental disability.").
15. Professor Russell Pearce has argued that this drift is inevitable and salutary. See
Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional
Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229,
1231-32 (1995).
16. One sign that things have not improved is the continued focus on these issues by
lawyer regulators, bar associations, and legal academics. Ten states have commissions on
professionalism. See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONALISM, A GUIDE TO
PROFESSIONALISM COMMISSIONS ix, 4-6 (2001) (listing Florida, Georgia, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, and Texas as
states with professionalism commissions), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
scopscommissionguide.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). More such
commissions are planned. See Roy T. Stuckey, Introduction, 52 S.C. L. REV. 443, 443
(2001). At least eleven law schools have legal ethics centers. See id. Professor Rhode has
collected some evidence of improved professionalism, and makes a persuasive case that
while things do not appear any better since the launch of professionalism efforts, there is
no evidence that they are any worse. See RHODE, INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 12-13.
17. Suggestions include requiring a "pervasive approach" to teaching professional
responsibility to law students, i.e., requiring some consideration of ethical issues
throughout the law school curriculum. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD xxix (2d ed. 1998) (providing
"coverage of all the basic professional responsibility issues that would be part of a
specialized course in the subject, as well as materials for integrating such issues into the
core curriculum.") [hereinafter RHODE, PERVASIVE METHOD]; Peter A. Joy & Kevin C.
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18professionalism continuing legal education ("CLE") courses, more
stringent character and fitness reviews for bar admissions, 19 more
civility and professionalism creeds/standards,2 0  and more public
McMunigal, Teaching Ethics in Evidence, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 961, 961-63 (2003)
(making a general case for the importance of a pervasive approach to teaching ethics).
Other suggestions include moving the required professional responsibility class to the first
year curriculum, adding hours to the class, and requiring an additional upper-level ethics
class. See Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most
Important Subject in Law School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 719, 735 & n.104 (1998) ("At a
minimum, legal ethics education must include a required first year, first semester course of
at least three credits, a required advanced course of at least three credits, and pervasive
teaching throughout the curriculum."). Given that the two-credit required professional
responsibility class is already among the most neglected and disliked law school classes by
faculty and students alike, see infra notes 207-212 and accompanying text, the efficacy of
more required professional responsibility training is open to question.
18. These CLE classes fall into several categories. At least forty states require every
lawyer to regularly attend some type of professionalism CLE. See Dane S. Ciolino,
Redefining Professionalism as Seeking, 49 LOY. L. REV. 229, 230-31 (2003) (noting that
"the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1997 amended its Rules for Continuing Legal Education
to require that every Louisiana lawyer attend at least one hour of professionalism CLE
each year" (footnote omitted)); ABA CENTER FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION,
Summary of MCLE State Requirements, at http://www.abanet.org/cle/mcleview.html (last
visited Sept. 16, 2004) (listing states) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Interestingly, many of these states allow classes in substance abuse in lieu of the ethics
requirement. See id. Other states, including New York, Louisiana, Kentucky, Idaho,
Florida, Maryland, and Delaware require new lawyers to attend a basic
skills/professionalism orientation to "bridge the gap" between law school and practice.
See id.; Pamela J. White, Holistic Approach to Professionalism, MD. B.J., Sept.-Oct. 2003,
at 19, 20 (describing the mandatory "Professionalism Course" taken by all new Maryland
attorneys). Anyone who has attended or taught an ethics CLE class will agree that they
are more likely to cause an increase in cases of narcolepsy than any increase in ethical
lawyer behavior. For a historical view on these courses, see generally THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTrEE ON CONTINUING
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, A MODEL FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION:
STRUCTURE, METHODS, AND CURRICULUM, (Discussion Draft 1980) (proposing local or
regional CLE organizations designed to serve lawyers within their jurisdiction with certain
methods and curricula); ALI-ABA JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.,
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE AND
RESPONSIBILITY (1959) (examining the state of continuing legal education and
recommending an increased emphasis on professional responsibility).
19. See JUSTICES ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at 32-34 (arguing for a beefed up
character and fitness evaluation for bar admission, and for greatly enhanced involvement
of law schools). Given the long-standing criticisms of these evaluations as ineffective,
unfairly applied, and overly burdensome, see, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as
a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 507-46 (1985) (evaluating the structural and
substantive problems of character assessment in bar certification procedures), a renewed
emphasis is of questionable value.
20. For a listing of these creeds/codes, see CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 5. Most of the codes are hortatory in nature. See, e.g.,
MSBA, Maryland State Bar Association Code of Civility, at http://www.msba.org/
departments/commpubl/publications/code.htm (May 1997) ("MSBA encourages all
Maryland lawyers and judges to honor and voluntarily adhere to the standards set forth in
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relations work." The mandatory rules side of the project includes
similar rehashes: more tinkering with the Rules,22 more "ethics
hotlines" to make compliance easier for lawyers,23 and more Lawyer
Assistance Programs to deal with lawyer addiction problems.24
these codes.") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Other codes are mandatory.
See D. N.J. R., Rules, Appendix R, at http://pacer.njd.uscourts.gov 101-06 (last visited Nov.
20, 2004) (appending ABA Section of Litigation, Guidelines for Litigation Conduct, to
local rules for the district) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); D. N.M., Civ. R.
83.9, at http://www.nmcourt.fed.us/web/DCDOCS/files/LRJulyO2finalamend2.pdf 21 (last
visited Nov. 29, 2004) ("Lawyers appearing in this District must comply with 'A Lawyer's
Creed of Professionalism of the State Bar of New Mexico.' ") (on file with North Carolina
Law Review).
21. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 4, at 302-03; JUSTICES ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at
39-44; Tom Godbold, Professionalism: A Goal that is Hard to Reach, but Must be
Preached, HOUSTON LAWYER, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 8, 8 (suggesting "[w]e ... stand
together as a profession and strive to better educate the public on what it is we do, how we
do it and why we do it"). This approach is my personal favorite. A high school anecdote
well describes the weakness of this reform. A somewhat unpopular friend of mine
launched a "get to know me" campaign in an effort to raise his popular standing. Another
friend recommended an immediate cessation of all such activities: "The problem, pal, is
that everyone knows you all too well, not the other way around."
22. Ethics 2000 is the latest in a series of revisions to the minimum standards that
govern lawyer conduct. For a short discussion of the drafting of Ethics 2000, see generally
Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441 (2002) (presenting a
description of the changes made by the Ethics 2000 Commission to the Model Rules from
the perspective of a Commission member); Carl A. Pierce, Variations on a Basic Theme:
Revisiting the ABA's Revision of Model Rule 4.2 (Part 1), 70 TENN. L. REV. 121 (2002)
(describing the redrafting of Rule 4.2); E. Norman Veasey, Ethics 2000: Thoughts and
Comments on Key Issues of Professional Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 5 DEL.
L. REV. 1 (2002) (describing the work of the Ethics 2000 Commission from the perspective
of its chairman). For a less glowing review, see generally Lester Brickman, The
Continuing Assault on the Citadel of Fiduciary Protection: Ethics 2000's Revision of Model
Rule 1.5, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1181 (2003) (arguing that the Ethics 2000 Commission's
revision of Model Rule 1.5 facilitates abuse of the contingency fee system).
23. See JUSTICES ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at 27-28 (suggesting increased
assistance to lawyers for ethical questions, including establishing an ethics hotline);
Veasey, supra note 11, at 899 (recommending "[aissistance with ethics questions, like an
ethics hotline").
24. See ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM: REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONALISM
COMMITTEE 34 & n.109 (1996) [hereinafter LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM] (arguing for
additional Lawyer Assistance Programs). See generally ABA COMM'N ON IMPAIRED
ATIORNEYS, AN OVERVIEW OF LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1991) (listing programs available to lawyers with a range of mental illness,
addiction, and other problems). Bar disciplinary authorities also have been notably
lenient on lawyer infractions when substance abuse or depression is involved. See Fred C.
Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 699-706
(2003) (describing mixed treatment of alcoholism in bar disciplinary proceedings); Todd
Goren & Bethany Smith, Note, Depression as a Mitigating Factor in Lawyer Discipline, 14
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1081, 1087 (2001) (describing how lawyers with mental disabilities
in the District of Columbia are given more lenient treatment in disciplinary procedures).
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There are a number of explanations for the struggles of the
professionalism movement. One possibility that I, among others,
have endorsed is that because the legal profession is basically self-
regulating,25 most regulations governing lawyers are self-serving and
aimed at increasing lawyer profits and protecting the monopolistic
nature of the legal profession.26 Under this hypothesis efforts at
professionalism are best seen as either sops to fend off greater
attention from the public or the judiciary, or crass economic
protectionism.27 Others have argued that there is actually no "crisis"
at all, the legal profession has been publicly disliked and internally
pressurized since lawyers have existed. 28 The lack of any actual crisis
would thus render any curative efforts moot.
29
25. For an overview of the legal profession's self-regulating nature, see Benjamin H.
Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer
Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1247-50 (2003).
26. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 142-57 (1989) (delivering a
crushing indictment of lawyer self-regulation as little more than institutionalized lawyer
self-interest); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics in Practice, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS'
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 3, 12-16 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000)
(describing the structure of professional regulation and arguing for more public input);
Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Practice, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 231 (1996) (arguing that "the bar has proved itself to be
supremely self-serving in regulating itself"). See generally Benjamin H. Barton, Why Do
We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct
Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429 (2001) (arguing that current regulatory approaches do
not fit economic justifications; the regulation is instead self-serving).
27. I have previously argued that continuous efforts to raise the barriers to entry to
the profession (i.e., the bar examination, the MPRE, stricter character and fitness) are
actually most likely consciously or unconsciously motivated by the desire of existing
practitioners to limit competition from new entrants. See Barton, supra note 26, at 445-48.
28. See generally Charles Silver & Frank B. Cross, What's Not to Like About Being a
Lawyer?, 109 YALE L.J. 1443 (2000) (reviewing ARTHUR L. LIMAN, LAWYER: A LIFE OF
COUNSEL AND CONTROVERSY (1998)). Proponents of this theory also frequently rely
upon a series of past unflattering depictions of lawyers, from the malefic lawsuit in
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Nicola Bradbury ed., Penguin Books 2003) (1853) to
Carl Sandburg's sardonic lawyer eulogy in CARL SANDBURG, The Lawyers Know Too
Much, in SELECTED POEMS 190, 190-91 (George Hendrick & Willene Hendrick eds.
Harcourt Brace & Co. 1996) ("The lawyers-tell me why a hearse horse snickers hauling a
lawyer's bones."), to Shakespeare's dictum in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND
PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2 ("[t]he first thing we do, let's kill all the
lawyers."). For a discussion of the true meaning and context of the above Shakespeare
quote, see Benjamin H. Barton, The Emperor of Ocean Park: The Quintessence of Legal
Academia, 92 CAL. L. REV. 585, 600 n.46 (2004) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE
EMPEROR OF OCEAN PARK (2002)) (arguing that despite the efforts of lawyer apologists,
Shakespeare in fact meant to disrespect lawyers).
29. One of my reviewers suggested that a lack of a crisis makes this Article moot; if
there is no crisis, why should we worry about any schism within legal ethics? I have two
responses. First, given that bar regulators are reacting to a perceived crisis, the reality of a
crisis is meaningless. All that matters for purposes of this Article is that regulating
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Despite the persuasive force of these explanations, they do not
jibe with the substantial efforts that innumerable lawyers, judges, and
academics have poured into these concerns or with the very real sense
of malaise within the profession.3' This Article argues that despite
the sincerity of these efforts, they have failed largely because the
profession has divided what was once the single unifying goal for bar
associations and lawyer regulators31-providing moral, ethical, and
practical guidance on how to practice law32-into two quite distinct,
and in some ways contradictory goals, thus undercutting the entire
strategies are being created to address the crisis. Second, as a matter of human psychology
I take general agreement that a crisis or a problem exists as sufficiently serious to justify
use of the word "crisis".
30. See generally GLENDON, supra note 3 (identifying a number of problems faced by
lawyers, judges, and law schools and examining their possible consequences); ANTHONY
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993)
(describing a lack of morale in the legal profession and concluding that legal institutions
are not capable of reviving the ideal of the lawyer-statesman); SOL M. LINOWITZ, THE
BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
(1994) (asserting that the legal profession has lost its way and calling on lawyers, judges,
and the bar to make reforms); RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL
COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER: TRUTH, JUSTICE, POWER, AND GREED (1999)
(urging increased attention to ethics and improved public relations throughout the legal
profession). My previous scholarship in this area has looked at the multitudinous
problems of lawyer regulation from an outsider's point of view and used economic analysis
to elucidate some of the more glaring weaknesses. In this Article I take an insider's point
of view and look at our current worries as a lawyer and law professor. In that regard, I
take the bar at its word when it says it has a serious problem and it is earnestly
endeavoring to solve it. The question this Article seeks to answer is, why are these efforts
so unsuccessful, and how could they be improved?
31. I use the term "lawyer regulators" with some regularity in this Article. Since the
legal profession is largely self-regulated, "lawyer regulators" refers to those in charge of
creating and enforcing the regulations that govern the legal profession. Nominally state
supreme courts are in charge in all fifty states. See Barton, supra note 25, at 1249. As a
practical matter the ABA and state bar associations hold the greatest sway, and since the
early twentieth century the ABA has drafted the baseline Rules/Codes/Canons that
govern lawyer conduct. See id. at 1188-200.
32. In reading this Article some reviewers have asked for a definition of these three
terms, or more pointedly, challenged me to differentiate between them. I use these three
terms, "moral, ethical, and practical," in this order purposefully, to express the breadth of
guidance the Canons offered to lawyers from the broadest and most personal (moral) to
the narrowest and most generally applicable (practical). By "moral" I mean the dictionary
definition: "Of or pertaining to human character or behaviour considered as good or bad;
of or pertaining to the distinction between right and wrong, or good and evil, in relation to
the actions, volitions, or character of responsible beings." 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 1827 (Lesley Brown ed., 1993).
"Ethical" is explicitly related to the moral, but it refers to a more systematic, or scientific
approach to morality, i.e., it is less personal and has a structure beyond any single
individual's moral leanings. See id. at 856. "Practical" specifically refers to the nuts and
bolts of lawyering, and is the least personal of the three terms. Id.
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project.33 The original, unified goal is best embodied by the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics, which provided both general moral
and ethical advice and specific practical advice to lawyers.34 This
unified statement was first split by the adoption of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility,35 which separated the general (entitled
"canons" and "ethical considerations") from the mandatory
minimums ("disciplinary rules"), and then the Rules of Professional
Conduct,3 6 which eliminated the broadly moral altogether.
Now there are two distinct goals. On the one hand, the efforts of
attorney regulators to draft, redraft, and continuously narrow the
minimum rules of lawyer behavior are the sine qua non of the last
thirty years of the professionalism movement. The goal of these
efforts is, most charitably put, to maximize the number of lawyers
who know and follow the minimum rules of the profession. Less
charitably, the goal is to make it easier to follow the minimum
standards.37  The drafters have largely eliminated the broad,
philosophical (and thus harder to apply) standards contained in the
predecessor Canons of Professional Ethics and Code of Professional
Responsibility and have sharpened the minimums into a quasi-
criminal set of rules.3" They have also set up multiple avenues,
through ethics hotlines and ethics committees, for pre-determining
33. While it is clear from an analysis of the regulatory activities that there are two
distinct goals, lawyer regulators frequently treat these goals as if they are identical, or
conflate them.
34. See infra notes 67-88 and accompanying text (discussing the structure and
adoption of the ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS).
35. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text (discussing the structure and
adoption of the MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY).
36. See infra notes 96-107 and accompanying text (discussing the structure and
adoption of the MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT).
37. See Thomas D. Morgan, Real World Pressures on Professionalism, 23 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 409, 419 (2001) ("The effect of the move from general aspirations
to detailed standards, however, in the minds of many became a move from a reach for
professionalism to a search for loopholes that would justify lower and lower standards of
behavior.").
38. The ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT have largely replaced the
Code and are framed almost solely in terms of the minimum standards of lawyer behavior.
See infra note 102 and accompanying text. For a specific and much discussed example,
consider the delicate balance struck by the Canons between zealous advocacy and the
warning that it is not "the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in
winning his client's cause." See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, CANON 15
(1908). Compare the nuance of Canon 15, and its requirement that a lawyer "must obey
his own conscience and not that of his client" with the Rules and the Code, which basically
require any and all efforts with the bounds of the law in support of zealous advocacy. See
CODE DR 7-101, DR 7-102; RULE 3.1-3.3. For a seminal discussion of the systematic
shortcomings of a zealous advocacy requirement, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS &
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 11-30 (1988).
2005]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the propriety of any questionable actions. Thus, while bar
associations and lawyer regulators once sought to offer lawyers moral
and ethical guidance for the practice of law, regulators have
increasingly focused on minimum standards of lawyer conduct. For
purposes of clarity I will refer to this set of goals as the "minimalist"
project.
On the other hand, bar associations and attorney regulators have
felt a backlash from the legalization of what was once accurately
termed "legal ethics," and have attempted to raise the ethical
consciousness of the profession as a whole through hortatory, non-
binding efforts. In this context "ethics" means the dictionary
definition-"a set of moral principles" 39 -not the narrower, minimum
rules of conduct meaning regularly ascribed to "legal ethics."'  In this
regard lawyer regulators are actually trying to accomplish a much
headier mission: they are trying to make lawyers more moral and
ethical. I will refer to this goal as the "broadly ethical" project.4"
These two goals conflict and undercut each other in several
important ways. The broadly ethical project's focus upon a moral
world outside of the minimum legal rules actually draws attention to
the relatively picayune nature of the minimalist project, and breeds
cynicism among members of the profession and law students
interested in considering more than just minimum allowable
boundaries.
The continuing effort to eliminate the philosophical or broadly
39. See OXFORD, supra note 32, at 856.
40. See, e.g., Julius W. Gernes, Professionalism Aspirations: Encouraging
Professionalism, 58 BENCH & B. MINN. 32, 32 (2001) ("Legal Ethics can be defined as the
mandated minimum level of conduct required by the Minnesota Rules of Professional
Conduct."); Thomas E. Richard, Professionalism: What Rules Do We Play By?, 30 S.U. L.
REV. 15, 18 (2002) ("From these definitions it is apparent that legal ethics provide
minimum standards that lawyers must follow, while professionalism establishes lofty
standards that lawyers should follow.").
41. Note that the term "professionalism" as used by bar regulators and academics
actually straddles and conflates both of these distinct goals. See infra notes 109-121 and
accompanying text. Frequently the minimalist project itself is hailed as the cornerstone of
"professionalism," at other times "professionalism" is defined as being something more
than the required minimums. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text. In this later
definition the term "professionalism" most closely resembles my "broadly ethical" project,
and unless specifically noted, when this Article refers to regulator attempts to encourage
"professionalism" it refers to the "broadly ethical" project.
Nevertheless, this may actually be paying the "professionalism" movement too
much respect. There is a persuasive argument that professionalism is nothing more than
the minimalist project plus a non-binding emphasis on civility. Cf Thomas D. Morgan,
Creating a Life as a Lawyer, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 37, 45 (2003) (noting that some have
attempted to define "professionalism" as "civility").
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ethical from the Rules themselves further exacerbates this problem.
Criminal law theorists have long argued that the criminal law is most
effective when its proscriptions track the norms and morals of
society.42 This is because legal proscriptions that fit commonly held
morality are generally obeyed regardless of enforcement or the odds
of being caught. The efficacy of more "administrative" criminal laws
not easily recognizable as common morality relies much more on
actual and perceived government enforcement. If these rules are
enforced, they are followed; if not, people generally feel little moral
compunction about violating them. This is why many people would
not shoplift while a cashier turns her back, although the odds of being
caught are not high, but many people violate the speed limit or
jaywalk when they sense no police presence. By divorcing the Rules
governing lawyers from the broadly moral in favor of a series of
technical regulations, the drafters have decreased the odds that
lawyers who do not fear reprisals will follow the rules.
The minimalist project, likewise, has choked off much of the
broadly ethical effort. Professor Heidi Li Feldman, among others,
has persuasively criticized the mode of "ethical deliberation" inspired
by the current regulatory structure.43 The ABA's new, narrower
Rules of Professional Conduct encourage, or even require,
reductionist and simplistic thinking about complicated issues. When
confronted by a thorny moral or ethical issue, lawyers are encouraged
to consult the black letter Rules to determine what is allowed, what is
mandated, and what is banned. The thought process begins and ends
with consultation and application of the Rules. Broader questions of
context, personal morality, or a greater duty to society at large can be
(and are thus frequently) ignored.44
Black letter rules trigger a particular mode of thinking-or
heuristic-in lawyers: we are trained to read carefully and to analyze
42. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
43. See Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical
Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885,885-89 (1996) (stating that the current Rules inspire,
and may require, a "technocratic" approach to ethical dilemmas); see also SIMON, supra
note 9, at 9-25 (noting that current approaches to professional responsibility require a
severely restricted and "categorical" approach to ethical judgment); Richard Delgado,
Norms and Social Science: Towards a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 933, 953 (1991) (arguing that professional responsibility rules "often function
affirmatively to encourage a sort of minimal-ethicality, according to which actors are
rewarded for being as 'minimally ethical' as possible").
44. See Feldman, supra note 43, at 889-908 (using the example of the Lake Pleasant
bodies case to demonstrate the shortcomings of a legalistic approach to a complex ethical
issue); SIMON, supra note 9, at 138-69 (comparing the legalistic "dominant view" of legal
ethics with "contextual judgment").
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rules to find (as precisely as possible) the boundary between legal and
illegal behavior.45 When lawyers apply this same boundary-seeking
process to issues of ethics or professional responsibility, the search for
the border between permitted and proscribed behavior frequently
displaces any consideration of the more general ethical question: "is
this the right thing to do?" 6
The question of enforcement also becomes critical in this
boundary-seeking calculus. Lawyers are trained not only to
determine the boundaries of the law but also to consider the worst-
case scenario of violating any given law, i.e. the odds of being caught
and the likely punishment. Here the drafters' choice to emphasize
the boundary-seeking heuristic is particularly devastating because the
minimum Rules governing lawyers are, in fact, notoriously under-
enforced.a7
Therefore, the decision of lawyer regulators to divide the single
goal of providing ethical, moral, and practical advice to lawyers into
the twin goals of the minimalist and broadly ethical projects has
proven internally inconsistent and ultimately self-destructive. a I offer
45. For a good working definition of the psychological concept of heuristics, consider
the following: "The human brain is extremely efficient, but it is not a computer. The brain
has a limited ability to process information but must manage a complex array of stimuli.
In response to its natural constraints the brain uses shortcuts that allow it to perform well
under most circumstances." Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics or Biases in the Courts:
Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 61-62 (2000); see also ANTHONY G.
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 19-109 (2000) (discussing special
legal heuristics of categorization).
46. This is not to say that all lawyers have or will abandon personal morality.
Nevertheless, the current regulating scheme is at best neutral and at worst adverse to
careful consideration of broader morality.
47. See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 8-17 (1998) (providing
further disciplinary examples); Deborah L. Rhode, The Profession and the Public Interest,
54 STAN. L. REV. 1501, 1512 (2002) (citing examples of lax lawyer discipline); Fred C.
Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case
Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971 (2002)
(describing underenforcement and its results in the area of lawyer advertising); ABA
CENTER FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, STANDING COMM. ON PROF'L DISCIPLINE,
SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS 1998-99 1-8 (2001) (listing Chart I showing
that out of a national total of 116,424 complaints received by lawyer disciplinary agencies
in 1998 only 3,602 lawyers were formally charged, and Chart II showing that the great bulk
of the sanctions imposed were either private or public sanctions, the lowest levels of
discipline).
48. Admittedly, the history of twentieth century lawyer regulation establishes that
these two goals have been in tension since courts first began to enforce the Canons.
Lawyers complained about being held to broad standards, and the minimalist project, and
the never-ending quest for more "guidance" (read more black letter rules), began. See
infra notes 89-107 and accompanying text. Although the tension between the hortatory
and the mandatory existed under the Canons, I argue that this tension has currently
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a simple, but heretical solution: redraft the Canons with a single goal
in mind-giving moral, ethical, and practical guidelines for the
practice of law. This will reunite the broad and the narrow goals of
legal ethics, will give some needed meaning and attention to the
"broadly ethical" project, will fundamentally change the way lawyers
approach their minimalist duties (because, like the reading of the
Canons, the narrow will be read in light of the broad), and will make
the minimums more explicitly ethical, moral, and naturally followed.49
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I presents a brief history
of American legal ethics, and argues that legal ethics once had the
single goal of providing ethical, moral, and practical advice to
lawyers. It will also assert that since the Rules were instituted, that
goal has been bisected into separate minimalist and broadly ethical
goals. Part II asserts that this division actually undercuts both goals
on multiple fronts. Part III examines a specific recent regulatory
effort, the MPRE, and demonstrates how the twin goals undercut the
efficacy of the exam. Part IV proposes both a narrow solution
(explicitly recognize the two competing goals) and a broad solution
(redrafting the Canons).
I. THE HISTORICAL DIVISION OF A SINGLE GOAL INTO TWO
The history of American legal ethics begins with the broad
moralizations of two nineteenth-century law professors, and ends
with the black letter Rules of Professional Conduct that govern the
profession today. The origins of legal ethics are explicitly moral.
First and foremost discussions of legal ethics were meant to offer non-
binding moral, ethical, and practical guidance. As bar associations
grew in power, and ethical codes were widely accepted, courts began
to use the codes as the basis for attorney discipline. What was once
solely hortatory began to have binding, legal effect. Over time, this
brought increased attention to the ethics codes, and in reaction to
growing enforceability, bar associations shifted from broad to narrow
degenerated into open conflict. The decision to focus upon enforceability and to jettison
the broader ethical framework has resulted in the need for a free standing
"professionalism" movement and a new and more deleterious clash within lawyer
regulation.
49. Veterans of the battles between "Rules and Standards" and the voluminous
accompanying literature will recognize some of the above arguments. See generally Colin
S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983)
(discussing competing arguments for rules and standards); Issac Ehrlich & Richard A.
Posner, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 379 (1985) (same). This literature will be more thoroughly discussed and applied in
Part III.B infra.
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and from ethical and moral to quasi-criminal. When lawyer
regulators removed the moral underpinnings from their minimum
rules it led inexorably to a.bisection of the original goals into the
separate minimalist and broadly ethical projects of today.
A. Stage One: The Rebirth of Bar Associations, the Origins of Legal
Ethics, and the First Hortatory Codes
In the earliest days of American lawyers there was little
consideration of "legal ethics" as a distinct entity. The ethical and
moral obligations of lawyers derived largely from religious
principles," and lawyer conduct was regulated through the natural
peer pressure of a small, homogenous group" or through the common
law "summary jurisdiction" each court retained over the lawyers who
practiced before them.52
The early focus on legal ethics began in legal academia and was
promulgated by bar associations. In the last third of the nineteenth
century, organized bar associations rose to prominence"3 as city bar
associations5 4 and later as state55 and national associations.56 The bar
50. PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION
TO THE CIVIL WAR 186-92 (1965) (noting that nineteenth century lawyers described
themselves as a "sanctified" fraternity).
51. See HENRY WYNANS JESSUP, A STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS xxiv (1925) (noting
that prior to organized statements of ethics "tlfe traditions of the profession were
perpetuated and the fundamental principles observed" as a result of the "habit of the
tribe"); Fannie Memory Farmer, Legal Practice and Ethics in North Carolina 1820-1860,
in THE LEGAL PROFESSION, MAJOR HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS 274, 294-99
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 1987) (describing the lack of any formal code of ethics for North
Carolina attorneys between 1820-60, and the informal pressures to conform to certain
values of the legal profession); Bruce Frohnen, The Bases of Professional Responsibility:
Pluralism and Community in Early America, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931, 931-38 (1995)
(arguing that early American lawyers learned professional responsibility from other
lawyers, as well as the society at large); William R. Johnson, Education and Professional
Life Styles: Law and Medicine in the Nineteenth Century, 14 HIST. OF EDUC. Q. 185, 187-
92 (noting that in Wisconsin in the nineteenth century "[g]roup standards were defined
and enforced in an immediate and personal manner").
52. Under this summary jurisdiction a court could disbar or sanction an errant
attorney. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 524 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); EDWARD
P. WEEKS, A TREATISE ON ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 144-223 (Bancroft-
Whitney Co. 1892); Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures
in the United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 912-17 (1994).
53. See HENRYS. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 20 (1953); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 562-63 (1973); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 286-87 (1950); ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER
FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 253-69 (1953).
54. See WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE
ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 1890-1930 214-15 (1986); Philip J. Wickser, Bar
Associations, 15 CORNELL L. REV. 390,396-97 (1930).
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associations had a reform-minded agenda, focusing specifically on the
punishment of the "activities of a notorious fringe of unlicensed
practitioners, ' s7  as well as requiring higher qualifications for
admission to practice.58
As an aspect of the effort to "professionalize" the legal
profession, 9 nascent bar associations turned their attention to "codes
of ethics," beginning with Alabama in 1887.60 The Alabama Code
was based primarily on the written work of two law professors: David
Hoffman61  and George Sharswood.62  Both Hoffman's and
55. See POUND, supra note 53, at 259-69; FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 563.
56. Among the national bar associations was the ABA, founded in 1878 by seventy-
five gentlemen from twenty-one jurisdictions, out of approximately 60,000 lawyers then
practicing in the United States. ALFRED ZANTIZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE
PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES WITH
SOME ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA 208 (1921); see also John
A. Matzko, "The Best Men of the Bar": The Founding of the American Bar Association, in
THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 75-90 (Gerald W.
Gawalt ed., 1984) [hereinafter HIGH PRIESTS] (providing an overarching history of the
founding of the ABA). In general the members of these new bar associations were drawn
by invitation from the "elite" of practice. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 563; POUND,
supra note 53, at 255-70.
57. FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 562-63; see also Marvelle C. Webber, Origin and
Uses of Bar Associations, 7 A.B.A. J. 297, 298 (1921).
58. See W. Hamilton Bryson & E. Lee Shepard, The Virginia Bar, 1870-1900, in HIGH
PRIESTS, supra note 56, at 171.
59. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR 214-16 (1989); Allison Marston,
Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, 49
ALA. L. REV. 471, 473-76 (1998).
60. See CODE OF ETHICS, ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION (1887), reprinted in
DRINKER, supra note 53, at 352-63 [hereinafter ALABAMA CODE]. See generally
Marston, supra note 59 (providing a general overview of the history and content of the
1887 code of ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association). Between 1887 and 1906 the
Alabama Code was adopted, with minor changes, by bar associations in Georgia, Virginia,
Michigan, Colorado, North Carolina, Wisconsin, West Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, and
Missouri. See 31 A.B.A. REP. 685-713 (1907) (compiling the codes of ethics adopted by
the bar associations in Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, North Carolina, Virginia, Wisconsin, and West Virginia).
61. David Hoffman was a professor of law at University of Maryland for over twenty
years until 1836. See Maxwell Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a
Republican Legal Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673, 678-83 (1979); Stephen E. Kalish, David
Hoffman's Essay on Professional Deportment and the Current Legal Ethics Debate, 61
NEB. L. REV. 54, 59 (1982). In 1836 Hoffman published the second edition of his Course
on Legal Study, which contained a treatment of a subject that Hoffman termed "almost
wholly new," the study of a lawyer's professional deportment. See 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A
COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 723 (Morton J. Horwitz et. at., eds., Arno Press 1972) (2d ed.
1836). As an aspect of this new study, Hoffman included his fifty "Resolutions in Regard
to Professional Deportment," id. at 752-75, which has been widely recognized as the first
American attempt to boil the issues of professional deportment or ethics down into a
single statement. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT,
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Sharswood's writings on legal ethics were explicitly based upon
religious faith,63 but branched out to include both general and specific
advice on the ethical, moral, and practical meaning of practicing law.'
READINGS, AND DISCUSSION ToPics 59 (1985); M. H. Hoeflich, Legal Ethics in the
Nineteenth Century: The "Other Tradition," 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 793,795-96 (1999).
62. George Sharswood was elected Professor of Law at the University of
Pennsylvania in 1850, and served as Professor and Dean until 1868. See GEORGE
SHARSWOOD, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF LAW v (T & J.W. Johnson
& Co. 1870). In addition Sharswood served on the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania as
both a Justice and the Chief Justice. See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican
Origins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 249 (1992). In 1854,
Sharswood delivered a series of lectures to his law class at Pennsylvania concerning legal
ethics; these lectures were later published as an essay on legal ethics. See GEORGE
SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 7-8 (5th ed., T & J.W. Johnson &
Co. 1884) [hereinafter SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS]. Sharswood's essay proved
quite influential, and laid the basis for further codification of legal ethics. See LUBAN,
supra note 38, at xxviii (naming Sharswood the key predecessor to modern legal ethics);
Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063, 1063-64 (1978)
(same); Pearce, supra, at 243-47 (stating that Sharswood's essay formed the basis for the
Alabama Code of legal ethics, and eventually, the ABA's Canons). This is, of course, a
dubious achievement in the eyes of some. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
JUSTICE 41-42 (1976).
63. For example, Hoffman's reading list for the subject of professional deportment
includes the Proverbs of Solomon, and the Books of Ecclesiastes, Ecclesiasticus, and
Wisdom. See HOFFMAN, supra note 61, at 724; see also SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS, supra note 62, at 55, 181-82 ("There is, perhaps, no profession, after that of the
sacred ministry, in which a high-toned morality is more imperatively necessary than that of
the law."); Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the
1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 10-13 (1999) (referring to Hoffman and
Sharswood's legal ethics approach as "religious jurisprudence") (footnote omitted).
Given the religious mores of the times and social status of Sharswood and Hoffman it is
likely that both were heading off the criticism that any treatment of legal ethics beyond
the moral and ethical responsibilities required by their religious faith was either
superfluous, or worse heretical.
64. Hoffman's resolutions are somewhat eclectic, dealing with both specific details of
etiquette, see HOFFMAN, supra note 61, at 752, 767 (stating in Resolution II1, "[t]o all
judges, when in court, I will ever be respectful .... "; in Resolution V, "[i]n all intercourse
with my professional brethren, I will be always courteous."; in Resolution XXXVI,
"[e]very letter or note that is addressed to me, shall receive a suitable response, and in
proper time.") and business, see id. at 762-63 (stating in Resolution XXV, "I will retain no
client's funds beyond the period in which I can with safety and ease, put him in possession
of them;" in Resolution XXVI, "I will on no occasion blend with my own, my client's
money: if kept distinctly as his, it will be less liable to be considered as my own;" and
dealing with the treatment of retainers in Resolution XXIX), as well as broad exhortations
concerning the nature of law and morality. See id. at 765-66 (stating in Resolution
XXXIII, "[w]hat is wrong is not the less so from being common. And though few dare to
be singular, even in a right cause, I am resolved to make my own, and not the conscience
of others, my sole guide;" Resolution XXXIV, "Law is a deep science: its boundaries, like
space, seem to recede as we advance: and though there be as much certainty in it, as in
any other science, it is fit we should be modest in our opinions, and ever willing to be
further instructed").
Likewise, Sharswood's essay verges from specifics of practice, see, e.g.,
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The Alabama Code similarly ran the gamut from the broadly moral
to the narrowly practical.65 Although the Alabama code included an
exhortation to expose "Corrupt Attorneys" before "the proper
tribunals," the Codes themselves were non-enforceable. Like the
academic work of George Sharswood and David Hoffman, these
early codes were meant to guide lawyers, not bind them into specific
behavior.'
Thus, when the ABA first turned its attention to drafting the
Canons in 1905, there was already a substantial body of academic
writing and state rules to draw from.67 The impetus for the Canons
SHARSWOOD, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note 62, at 124 ("The importance of a good
handwriting cannot be overrated. A plain legible hand every man can write who chooses
to take the pains. A good handwriting is a passport to the favor of clients, and to the good
graces of judges, when papers come to be submitted to them."), to generalities of lawyerly
virtue. See, e.g., id. at 55 ("High moral principle is [the lawyer's] only safe guide; the only
torch to light his way amidst darkness and obstruction."). Sharswood's discussion of an
attorney's duties to his client is the lengthiest in the essay, and also the most controversial
among current commentators, who have claimed that Sharswood both supports and
undermines a vision of the lawyer's role as dependent upon the "adversary ethic."
Compare Bloomfield, supra note 61, at 687 (arguing that "[w]here Hoffman referred all
problems to the practitioner's conscience-that mirror of universal morality-Sharswood
opted for the external guidelines provided by the legal process itself.") and Marston, supra
note 59, at 495-96 (arguing that Sharswood encouraged lawyers to represent clients "with
the utmost zeal") with L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29
EMORY L.J. 909, 912-15 (1980) (arguing that Sharswood favored duty to the courts and
public above duty to clients) and Hoeflich, supra note 61, at 803-07 (arguing that
Sharswood favored a "middle road" between duty to clients and duty to the system as a
whole).
Both Hoffman and Sharswood have been identified as leaders in the "law as
science" movement in legal education of the mid-nineteenth century. See Howard
Schweber, The "Science" of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural Sciences in
Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 421, 438-39, 450-51
(1999). The influence of the law and science, and codification movements likely led both
Hoffman and Sharswood to attempt to inscribe the previously informal norms of legal
ethics.
65. The Code included broad rules such as "No Set Rule for Every Case" and "Must
Not Be a Party to Oppression," ALABAMA CODE, supra note 60, at 353, 356, and specific
practical advice, such as "Reputation of a 'Rough Tongue' Not Desirable" and
"Promptness and Punctuality." See id. at 358-59.
66. See Marston, supra note 59, at 501 ("Despite its legal unenforceability, Jones
authored the Code of Ethics for the benefit of practicing lawyers..."). During this period
the bar associations were small and selective, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 563, and
thus their pronouncements on ethics had little or no effect on practicing attorneys outside
of the bar associations (of which there were many) or on disbarment proceedings. See
WEEKS, supra note 52, at 144-223 (featuring an exhaustive listing of standards and cases
of disbarment up to 1898 without mentioning any State codes of ethics). See generally, 1
EDWARD M. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON ATTORNEYS AT LAW (1914) (published in
1914, and featuring an exhaustive listing of standards and cases of disbarment, without
mentioning any of the State codes of ethics).
67. At the 1905 meeting the Association adopted a resolution forming a committee to
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will sound familiar: a concern over the commercialization of the
profession and its low public esteem.68 The original call for the
Canons was explicitly religious and moral. 69 The ABA adopted the
Canons in 1908,70 and like their progenitors, the Canons included
both the broadly moral l and the practical,72 and were explicitly
hortatory in nature.73
B. Stage Two: The Transition from Hortatory to Enforceable
The Canons were extremely successful; by 1914 the Canons had
been adopted by thirty-one of the forty-five state bar associations.74
report "upon the advisability and practicability of the adoption of a code of professional
ethics .... " See 28 A.B.A. REP. 131-32 (1905). The original committee consisted of four
members of the ABA and no lay-people. See 29 A.B.A. REP. 604 (1906). The eventual
committee that drafted the Canons consisted of fourteen male, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant
lawyers. See Carle, supra note 63, at 16 & Appendix A.
68. See 28 A.B.A. REP. 384 (1905). For an exhaustive and excellent overview of every
aspect of the drafting and passage of the 1908 Canons, see James M. Altman, Considering
the A.B.A. 's 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORD. L. REV. 2395,2402-09 (2003) (describing the
initial impetus for the drafting of the Canons).
69. See Altman, supra note 68, at 2407 (noting that ABA president Henry St. George
Tucker called for the drafting of a code of legal ethics "in an explicitly religious context").
70. See 33 A.B.A. REP. 55-86 (1908).
71. For example, Canon 16 deals with "Restraining Clients from Improprieties,"
Canon 18 requires respectful "Treatment of Witnesses and Litigants," Canon 22 requires
"Candor and Fairness," and Canon 32 broadly states "The Lawyer's Duty in Its Last
Analysis." See 33 A.B.A. REP. 579-81, 584 (1908).
72. The practical prohibitions were among the more controversial and actually
foreshadow the ABA's future definitional struggles for minimum rules. The only Canon
that caused any debate concerned contingent fees, which were allowed, but only under the
supervision of court. See Altman, supra note 68, at 2482-84. Certain members argued
that contingent fees should be barred altogether. Id. In the end, the Canon passed with
compromise language. Id. The compromise stated, "[clontingent fees, where sanctioned
by law, should be under the supervision of the Court, in order that clients may be
protected from unjust charges." 33 A.B.A. REP. 578, 579 (1908) (emphasis omitted). In a
similar vein, the Canons barred lawyers purchasing "any interest in the subject matter of
the litigation which he is conducting" or "stirring up ... litigation." See id. at 578, 583.
The Canons also explicitly barred lawyer advertising, see id. at 582, despite the fact that
the Alabama Code and other progenitors explicitly allowed it. See, e.g., ALABAMA CODE,
supra note 60, at 356 (allowing newspaper advertisements, circulars, and business cards to
be used to promote lawyers); Altman, supra note 68, at 2484-91 (discussing the Canons,
which prohibited a variety of types of advertising by lawyers).
73. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 55-56 (1986) ("The
Canons were probably not intended to have any direct legal effect .... ); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1250 (1991) (stating that the
Canons had no "direct legal effect"). Nevertheless, the drafters hoped to have a concrete
effect upon the standards for lawyer disciplinary proceedings. See 29 A.B.A. REP. 602-03
(1906) (stating a hope that lawyers entering the bar would have to swear an oath to follow
the canons, thus making the canons enforceable); Altman, supra note 68, at 2499.
74. See 39 ABA REP. 560-61 (1914). The reaction of the press was favorable, see
AUERBACH, supra note 62, at 50-51, as were the reactions of various eminent lawyers.
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It is impossible to pinpoint exactly when the Canons first became the
basis for disciplinary action in America. The Canons were cited
almost immediately by scattered courts around the country, but were
persuasive rather than controlling authority.75 By the 1920s, the line
was beginning to blur. Courts still noted that the Canons were not
"binding obligation," but held that "an attorney may be disciplined by
[a] court for not observing" the Canons.76
This trend accelerated under the bar "integration" movement; in
See, e.g., David J. Brewer, The Ideal Lawyer, 98 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 587, 595-96 (1906)
(praising the canons in advance of their official adoption). A 1909 casebook relies almost
solely upon the Canons to supply its chapter on legal ethics, see WILLIAM LAWRENCE
CLARK, ELEMENTARY LAW 333-43 (1909), and a 1917 Legal Ethics Casebook includes
the Canons, as well as Hoffman's fifty resolutions as appendices. See GEORGE P.
COSTIGAN JR., CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON LEGAL ETHICS 555-82 (1917).
Costigan was involved in the drafting of the Canons, see Carle, supra note 63, at 21, and
was an early supporter. George P. Costigan, Jr., The Proposed American Code of Legal
Ethics, 20 THE GREEN BAG 57, 57-58 (1908).
75. For example, in a 1909 Illinois case, Wiersema v. Lockwood & Strickland Co., the
court first cited a number of cases for the specific point of law, and then quoted both "the
able and eminent Edward G. Ryan" and the ABA's Canons to establish a general point
concerning over-zealous advocacy. Wiersma v. Lockwood & Strickland Co., 147 111. App.
33, 37-41 (1909); see also In re Egan, 123 N.W. 478, 487 (S.D. 1909) (quoting a local
"eminent" lawyer and the ABA's canons for the same general proposition); State v.
Kaufmann, 118 N.W. 337, 338-39 (S.D. 1908) (citing to a number of cases, and also
quoting the Canons as "the best thought of the profession"). In these early days courts
seemed clear that while the Canons were useful as a general statement of ethical
standards, "legislation may perhaps be necessary to carry [them] fully into effect."
Ransom v. Ransom, 127 N.Y.S. 1027, 1033 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910) rev'd on other grounds,
133 N.Y.S. 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1911).
76. Hunter v. Troup, 146 N.E. 321, 324 (Ill. 1924); see also In re Cohen, 159 N.E. 495,
496-97 (Mass. 1928) (stating that "[c]odes of legal ethics adopted by bar associations of
course have no statutory force" but also quoting with approval a case stating that the
canon against advertising "thus incorporates in the code of ethics an ideal standard of
conduct which has been long and well recognized and ... [t]he attorney who disregards
the rule is properly subject to rebuke if not to disbarment") (citation omitted); People v.
Berezniak, 127 N.E. 36, 39-40 (Ill. 1920) (stating that Canon 27 "does not have the binding
force of a statute in this state ... but it does set forth very fully the class of advertisements
and solicitations of business that is objectionable, unethical, and unprofessional, and is
most commendable in all other respects," and applying the Canon's standard as if it were
binding law); In re Schwarz, 161 N.Y.S. 1079, 1080 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916) (stating that the
attorney at issue "has transgressed Canon 27 of the Code of Ethics of the American Bar
Association..." and applying the Canon as if it were law). But see In re Clifton, 196 P.
670, 670-72 (Idaho 1921) (stating that "it would be going too far to hold that one may be
disbarred solely because he has failed to live up to the ideals which the canons of ethics of
a bar association set for its members as attorneys and citizens"). Courts particularly
focused on the Canons in the commercial areas of advertising, solicitation and contingency
fees. See, e.g., Berezniak, 127 N.E. at 38 (same); In re Schwarz, 161 N.Y.S. at 1080
(advertising); Ellis v. Frawley, 161 N.W. 364, 366 (Wisc. 1917) (contingency fees); Ransom
v. Ransom, 127 N.Y.S. 1027, 1033 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1910) (same) rev'd on other grounds, 133
N.Y.S. 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1911).
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the 1920s and 1930s bar association membership became a mandatory
prerequisite to the practice of law in many states.77 The integration
movement naturally led to a greater importance for the Canons
because a lawyer who violated a Canon might be removed from the
bar association, and thus disbarred from the practice of law.78
The ABA and other bar associations reacted to the increasing
enforceability7 9 of the Canons in two now familiar ways. First, the
ABA pursued extensive redrafting and retooling of the Canons in
pursuit of "additional guidance" to lawyers8" in 1928,81 1933,82 and
77. ORIE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK MCCOY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS
90 (1952) (describing the success of the "integration" effort between 1918 and 1934);
WOLFRAM, supra note 73, at 36-38 (describing "mandatory" bars, and their efforts "to
exercise greater control over... the discipline of lawyers."). The ABA explicitly endorsed
the concept of unified bar associations in 1920, and encouraged state associations to
become mandatory if possible. M. LOUISE RUTHERFORD, THE INFLUENCE OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ON PUBLIC OPINION AND LEGISLATION 32-33 (1937).
North Dakota was the only state to integrate its bar by 1922, but by 1930 seven states had
integrated, and by 1933 the number had swollen to eighteen. Id. at 33. By 1954 twenty-
five of forty-eight states had integrated bars, see ALFRED P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES 0.
PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 240-41 (1954), and by 1980 thirty-three states out of
fifty had integrated bars. See WOLFRAM, supra note 73, at 37. For an overview of the
integrated bar movement, see generally DAYTON MCKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR
(1963) (discussing life before the integrated bar, the rise of the integrated bar movement,
and consequences of an integrated bar).
78. The drafters of the Canons specifically expected that lawyers "failing to conform
thereto should not be permitted to practice or retain membership in professional
organizations, local or national, formed, as is the American Bar Association, to promote
the administration of justice and uphold the honor of the profession." See 29 A.B.A. REP.
602 (1906). The 1920s and 1930s also saw the ABA and state bar associations working
together to standardize enforcement and interpretation of ethical rules throughout the
country. See RUTHERFORD, supra note 77, at 89-92. As of 1924 there was a feeling that
"the easy days" for the alleged scofflaws were over: "The Bar is now awake. It has found
and will find more ways of making its ideals real-its canons of ethics actual governing
rules of conduct." See JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION?
156 (1924). As to whether many lawyers were actually disbarred, consider the general
history of the American bar's long, and unimpressive, tradition of lawyer discipline. See
ABEL, supra note 26, at 143-50.
79. In 1928 the ABA noted that "[t]he influence of the original canons has been very
widely extended ... they have been made the measure of standards in many judicial
opinions." See 53 A.B.A. REP. 119 (1928).
80. See 58 A.B.A. REP. 153 (1933) (stating that thirteen additional canons were
adopted in 1928 as a "specific guide" to situations unforeseen in the drafting of the
original canons).
81. See 53 A.B.A. REP. 130-31 (1928) (noting the ABA approval of thirteen new
Canons in addition to the original thirty-two, as well as substantial editing of Canon 28 on
stimulating business). The new Canons again sought to squelch various entrepreneurial
practices including the division of fees with another lawyer, employment by an
intermediary (which essentially banned group representation through unions by allowing a
lawyer to represent a group, but not allowing that lawyer to render advice to individual
members), the acceptance of compensation or commission from non-clients, and paying
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1937.83 The tone of these debates and the care taken in drafting the
new and revised Canons displays the ABA's recognition of its role in
drafting a binding ethics code.8'
Second, bar associations began to establish ethics committees to
advise inquirers respecting interpretations of the Canons, starting
with the ethics committee of the New York County Lawyers'
Association ("NYCLA") in 1912 and the ABA's committee in 1913.85
From the outset the work of these ethics committees was meant to
bring clarity and specificity to the ethical duties of lawyers under the
litigation expenses. See id. at 496-98.
82. In 1933 the ABA altered five Canons, and adopted an additional Canon, which
allowed a lawyer to publish a "brief, dignified notice" of the fact of his representation to
other lawyers. See 58 A.B.A. REP. 155-78, 428-36 (1933).
83. In 1937 there were additional changes to ten of the forty-six canons, and a new
Canon 47 was adopted, which explicitly barred any possible involvement with, or aid to,
the unauthorized practice of law. See 62 A.B.A. REP. 350-52, 761-67 (1937).
84. The tone of the ABA proceedings over the 1933 alterations was substantially
different from the tone of the original adoption of the Canons in 1908, or even the
addition of new Canons five years earlier in 1928, and clearly reflects the strain placed
upon the ABA in managing the drafting of a binding code of legal ethics. In 1908 the only
substantial controversy regarded contingent fees, and thirty-two other canons were
adopted with little or no discussion. See 33 A.B.A. REP. 55-86 (1908). In 1928 there was
controversy concerning lawyer bonding and the division of fees by lawyers, but otherwise
there was no "unfavorable comment [or] criticism of any of the other Canons," 53 A.B.A.
REP. 120 (1928). By 1933 the recommendations were "not free from controversy," there
was "no general agreement in the profession as to some" of the changes, and "[tihe
difference of opinion has extended to the committee meeting this week." 58 A.B.A. REP.
154 (1933). The suggestions received, and the discussion of each change, focused much
more carefully on the specific wording of each change, reflecting a recognition that these
rules would be binding, and therefore seeking to clarify their meaning as much as possible.
See id. at 155-80, 430-37.
From 1937 until the adoption of the Code, the Canons remained essentially
unchanged, with one notable exception. Canon 27, which dealt with advertising and
solicitation, was amended in 1937, 1940, 1942, 1943, 1951, and 1963. See DRINKER, supra
note 53, at 25-26; Armstrong, supra note 62, at 1066. Canon 43 was amended in 1942 and
Canon 46 was amended in 1956. Otherwise, the Canons remained the same from 1938
until the adoption of the Code in 1969. See DRINKER, supra note 53, at 25-26; Armstrong,
supra note 62 at 1066.
85. See 36 A.B.A. REP. 147 & n. 10 (1913) (announcing creation of ABA Committee
to gather ethics information); Charles A. Boston, Practical Activities in Legal Ethics, 62 U.
PA. L. REV. 103, 111 (1913) (discussing NYCLA Committee); Ted Finman & Theodore
Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A
Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29
UCLA L. REV. 67, 69 n.4 (1981) (same). It was not until 1922 that the ABA committee's
responsibilities changed from information gathering to more direct interpretation of the
Canons. The committee was empowered for the first time to hear and act upon ethical
complaints concerning ABA members, 47 A.B.A. REP. 49-51 (1922), and "to express its
opinion concerning proper professional conduct, and, particularly concerning the
application of the tenets of ethics thereto" when requested by state or local bar
associations. See id. at 49-51.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83
Canons.86 Though the opinions of the NYCLA and ABA committees
were advisory and unofficial,87 they certainly had a strong influence.88
C. Stage Three: The Code Separates the Broadly Ethical from the
Minimalist
Despite these efforts to clarify and distill the requirements under
the Canons, there were repeated cries that the Canons were too
general.89 Starting in the 1950s the ABA appointed three separate
86. The NYCLA committee was meant to be an "educational force, in illustrating the
practical application of the principles and sound traditions of legal ethics." See Boston,
supra note 85, at 113-14. Interestingly, the NYCLA apparently also had a "Discipline
Committee," which handled complaints against lawyers and discipline, that lacked the
"resources for vigorous prosecution," id. at 108, but attempted to compensate through the
"ethical education of the Bar" through the committee's handling of ethical questions. Id.
This early allocation of resources well illustrates the bar's long tradition of substituting
education for enforcement.
87. See OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NEW YORK COUNTY
LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION xi (1956) [hereinafter NYCLA OPINIONS]; Finman & Schneyer,
supra note 85, at 83-88 & n.67.
88. See NYCLA OPINIONS, supra note 87; Finman & Schneyer, supra note 85, at 83-
88. Each of the questions and answers was published for review, albeit with the caveat
that "the questions are submitted ex parte, and the replies are predicated only upon the
facts stated." See Boston, supra note 85, at 117. Furthermore, the ABA ethics committee
had responsibility both for answering questions and discipline of ABA members for a
lengthy time, see 48 A.B.A. REP. 49-51 (1922); 58 A.B.A. REP. 404-05 (1933) (describing
the ABA ethics committee's dual roles in answering requests for advice from bar
associations as well as individuals and member discipline), so any positions taken by the
committee in its advisory opinions would be followed in disciplinary proceedings.
These opinions are unusual in two respects: they were offered before the conduct
had occurred, or at least before the issues had been adjudicated (advisory) and were ex
parte (non-adversarial). The fact that the bar association took, and takes, the effort to
produce these opinions, despite the American tradition against advisory opinions, see, e.g.,
PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 65-72 (3d. ed.1988) (discussing the Constitutional history of the
advisory opinion issue); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 47-53 (1994)
(discussing tradition of advisory opinions in the federal courts); HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 630-47 (1994) or non-adversarial proceedings,
see, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 3-4
(1975) (discussing the importance of the adversarial process); Finman & Schneyer, supra
note 85, at 159-67 (criticizing the non-adversarial nature of the ABA committee's work);
Monroe H. Freedman, Are the Model Rules Unconstitutional?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685,
688-89 (1981), establishes the lengths that bar associations are willing to travel to clarify
and simplify the regulatory duties of lawyers.
89. See 60 A.B.A. REP. 94-95 (1935) (arguing that the Canons offer little concrete
guidance, and suggesting "a Code of Practice which will deal not with general principles
but with the specific abuses involved"); BLAUSTEIN & PORTER, supra note 77, at 246-51
(noting that numerous Canons were not being followed, and suggesting specific
alterations); Symposium, A Re-Evaluation of the Canons of Professional Ethics, 33 TENN.
L. REV. 129 (1966); John F. Sutton, Jr., Guidelines to Professional Responsibility, 39 TEx.
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committees aimed at reform.90  In the 1960s the ABA began
preparing a code based upon an entirely new structure. The Code of
Professional Responsibility, adopted by the ABA in 1969, 91 is divided
into three portions. The Canons and Ethical Considerations provide
"fundamental ethical principles" for "the aspiring." 92 By contrast, the
L. REV. 391, 422-23 (1961) (arguing that the Canons are insufficiently specific to set a
reasonable minimum standard); Edward L. Wright, The Code of Professional
Responsibility: Its History and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REV. 1, 4 (1970) (quoting a 1958
American Bar Foundation report stating that the Canons do not present "sufficient detail"
in dealing with "specific situations encountered in actual practice"); Professional Ethics.
Charity & Perjury, TIME, May 13, 1966, at 81 (quoting Professor Anthony Amsterdam as
describing the Canons as "vaporous platitudes ... which have somewhat less usefulness as
guides to lawyers in the predicaments of the real world than do valentine cards as guides
to heart surgeons in the operating room"); cf. E. Wayne Thode, The Ethical Standard for
the Advocate, 39 TEX. L. REV. 575 (1961) (arguing that the Canons were not tailored to
meet the needs of courtroom advocates and shouldn't be supplanted by non-authoritative
standards).
There were also calls to broaden the Canons. In 1925 Henry Jessup criticized the
Canons as insufficiently "generic." See HENRY WYNANS JESSUP, THE PROFESSIONAL
IDEALS OF THE LAWYER: A STUDY OF LEGAL ETHICS xxx (1925) ("An astute
pettifogger, and their name is Legion, may say, and many have said, Canon XY does not
prohibit what I did-it specifies just what it prohibits-and he pleads 'Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.' "). Similarly, Justice Harlan Stone argued for a new conception of legal
ethics, "beyond the petty details of form and manners which have been so largely the
subject of our codes of ethics, to more fundamental consideration of the way in which our
professional activities affect the welfare of our society as a whole." Harlan F. Stone, The
Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1934) ("[W]e must give more
thoughtful consideration to squaring our own ethical conceptions with the traditional
ethics and ideals of the community at large."). The ABA retorted that "while it might be
more desirable to have the Canons consist of a statement of fundamental principles ...
rather than definite rules," it would be inadvisable to change the Canons. See 49 A.B.A.
REP. 467 (1924); 58 A.B.A. REP. 437 (1933) (stating that a "more comprehensible but
concise" statement of "general principles" could be formulated, but rejecting an attempt
to state "a philosophic basis of general principles" in lieu or in addition to the Canons).
90. During the 1950s the ABA formed the Special Committee on Canons of Ethics,
see Philbrick McCoy, The Canons of Ethics: A Reappraisal by the Organized Bar, 43
A.B.A. J. 38, 38 (1957), and the "Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility," which
was aimed at formulating "an understanding of the nature of the lawyer's professional
responsibilities." See Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility:
Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1159 (1958). In 1964 the ABA created a
Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, see AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS, CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: FINAL DRAFT v (1969) [hereinafter CODE]; John F.
Sutton, Jr., Re-Evaluation of Professional Ethics: A Reviser's Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REV.
132, 132 (1966), which was "directed to investigate the existing Canons of Professional
Ethics and to recommend any changes therein which may be indicated." 90 A.B.A. REP.
221 (1965).
91. See Association's House of Delegates Meets in Dallas, August 11-13, 55 A.B.A. J.
970, 970-72 (1969). The Code became binding upon the ABA membership on January 1,
1970. See id. at 970.
92. CODE, supra note 90, at 1. The Canons are "axiomatic norms, expressing in
general terms the standards of professional conduct," while the Ethical Considerations are
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Disciplinary Rules are "mandatory in character" and "state the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
being subject to disciplinary action. 9 3
The Code thus recognized and reacted to a process that began
when the Canons began to serve as binding law. Throughout the
twentieth century, bar associations sought to clarify and distill the
minimum standards of lawyer conduct from the broader
pronouncements within the Canons. The Code very consciously
makes this distillation patent: the moral and ethical were physically
placed in a separate category from the minimum rules.94 This change
aimed to let the broader ethical considerations "serve their proper
functions"-cease to serve as controlling law and to avoid "the misuse
by disciplinary authorities of such generalities."95 Thus, the Code is
the ABA's first explicit division between "professionalism" and
minimum Rules: the Disciplinary Rules govern lawyer conduct, and
the Canons and the Ethical Considerations are relegated to food for
"aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the
profession should strive." Id. at 2; see also John F. Sutton, Jr., The American Bar
Association Code of Professional Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 TEX. L. REV. 255,
258 (1970) (describing Code's structure). Professor Sutton served as the reporter for the
Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards. See 90 A.B.A. REP., supra note 90, at 221.
93. See CODE, supra note 90; Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously, 77
TUL. L. REV. 527, 531 (2003) (describing the workings of the Code). Despite the change
in form, the Code did not attempt to change or expand the minimum standards of
professional conduct under the Canons, instead the Code sought to restate and clarify the
governing law as represented by the Canons and the ABA Committee on Professional
Ethics. See Bernard G. Segal, President's Page, 55 A.B.A. J. 893, 893 (1969); Sutton, supra
note 92, at 264. In 1969 ABA president Bernard Segal formed a committee to "stimulate
adoption and implementation of the code." See Segal, supra, at 893. The committee was
extraordinarily successful, and by 1972 all but three states had either adopted, or were
adopting, the Code. See H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr. Federalism and Choice of Law in the
Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73, 87-88 & n.52 (1997).
94. The guiding concept behind the new structure was that the "ethical climate of the
legal profession is maintained by two forces ... a lawyer's conscience [and] the application
of, or threat of application of, legal sanctions." John F. Sutton, Jr., Re-Evaluation of
Professional Ethics: A Reviser's Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REV. 132, 134 (1966); cf Fuller &
Randall, supra note 90, at 1159-60 (arguing that a "true sense" of professional
responsibility comes from a broad "understanding of the reasons that lie back of specific
restraints" and that lawyers have a "special need of a clear understanding of [their]
obligations"). Thus, a code of legal ethics should address both of those restraints, by
providing "statements of guiding principles ... to appeal to the lawyer's intelligence," and
also providing "minimum standards made obligatory on all lawyers." Sutton, supra note
92, at 134-35. See also, Wright, supra note 89, at 10-11. The drafters of the Code
recognized that the Canons attempted to reach both of these goals, but argued that the
Canons were "an accidental combination of the two" and failed as aspirational statements
because of gross "overstatement" and were too confusing to work as clear minimum
standards. See Sutton, supra note 92, at 136-37; Wright, supra note 89, at 10-11.
95. See Sutton, supra note 92, at 264.
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thought.
D. Stage Four: The Rules and the Triumph of Minimalism
Despite the high hopes of the Code's drafters for clarity and
cohesion, the Code fell under attack almost immediately,96 and the
ABA revised the Code four times between 1969 and 1977.97 By 1977
the ABA had decided that a more "comprehensive rethinking" of the
Code was necessary, and the ABA President appointed the
"Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards."98 From the
outset the drafters of the Rules expressed disdain for the tri-partite
format of the Code99 and aimed for the "familiar" Restatement format
96. See, AUERBACH, supra note 62, at 286-88; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS
IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978); JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 64-67
(1978); Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90
HARV. L. REV. 702 (1977) (arguing that a reform in the Code was needed to shift
emphasis from regulating attorneys to protecting clients); L. Ray Patterson, Wanted: A
New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63 A.B.A. J. 639 (1977) (recognizing that the
Code looked more like laws than ethical guidelines); John F. Sutton, How Vulnerable is
the Code of Professional Responsibility, 57 N.C. L. REV. 497 (1979) (contending that the
Code's overemphasis on the principle of loyalty to the client lacks mitigating rules, such as
a lawyer's duty of candor to the court or fairness to his opponent); Symposium, The
American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, 48 TEx. L. REV. 255 (1970)
(including articles criticizing Canons One and Two and the Code's treatment of lawyer
specialization and group legal services arrangements); Charles Frankel, Book Review, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 874 (1976) (reviewing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1970)).
97. Morgan, supra note 96, at 703 & n.10.
98. This committee was informally known as the "Kutak Commission," after
committee chairman Robert Kutak. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON
EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, FINAL DRAFT OF THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3 (1981).
99. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules of Legal Ethics: The Drafting Task, 36 REC.
ASSOC. BAR CITY N.Y. 77, 85-90 (1981) (arguing against the tripartite division of the
Code); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and Professional Aspirations, 30
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 571, 571-72 (1980) (arguing that a "comprehensive revision is required
because the structure of the present Code has turned out to be disastrous due to its three-
level structure"); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Legal and Ethical Position of the Code of
Professional Ethics, 5 SOC. RESP.: JOURNALISM, LAW, & MED. 5, 10 (1979) (arguing that
legal regulation requires black letter rules, not ethics); Robert J. Kutak, Coming: The New
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J. 46, 47-48 (1980) [hereinafter The New
Model Rules]; Robert J. Kutak, The Rules of Professional Conduct in an Era of Change, 29
EMORY L.J. 889, 899 (1979) (arguing that "a constant criticism of the Model Code was
that it tended to speak with two voices, creating conflict between its description of
aspirations on the one hand and its proscription of certain conduct on the other");
Patterson, supra note 96, at 639 (arguing that the Code is a "middle stage in the
development of the law for lawyers" because it still contains "ethical rules," which should
be replaced by "legal rules"); Murray L. Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 953, 955 (1980) (summarizing the views of the drafters of the
Rules).
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of "black letter Rules accompanied by explanatory Comments.'' °°
The Rules thus took "the next logical step:"'01  the Canons
intermingled both broad ethical language and specific rules, the Code
separated the ethical from the purely legal, and the Rules jettisoned
the broadly moral or ethical in favor of black letter minimums of
lawyer conduct.102 Unsurprisingly, the Rules proved at least as
controversial as the Code.0 3 Calls of a crisis in professionalism and
100. See CTR. FOR PROF. RESP., A.B.A., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-98,353
app. D (1999) [hereinafter RULES LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. The Kutak Commission's first
draft of the Rules attempted to change or add to some of the substantive law in the Code,
notably new rules limiting client confidentiality, requiring pro bono work, and new
regulations of conflicts of interest. See WOLFRAM, supra note 73, at 61; Moulton, supra
note 93, at 89-90. These new proposals were extremely controversial, see Ted Schneyer,
Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
14 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 677, 702-03 (1989), and the Kutak Commission drafted successively
milder versions until the approval of the final version in 1983. See RULES LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra, at 351-52 app. C; WOLFRAM, supra note 73, at 61; Moulton, supra note
93, at 89-90; Schneyer, supra, at 707-24, which hewed much closer to the black letter law
previously stated in the Code. In fact, the actual baseline minimums governing lawyer
conduct have not changed substantially from the Canons through the Code to the Rules.
See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39, 63-71
(1989); Hazard, Future of Ethics, supra note 73, at 1246-49; W. William Hodes, The Code
of Professional Responsibility, The Kutak Rules, and the Trial Lawyer's Code:
Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 739,741-42 (1981).
101. See Kutak, The New Model Rules, supra note 99, at 47.
102. There has been general scholarly agreement that the Rules represent the end of a
journey from broader ethical norms to narrower, more legalistic rules. See GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 18-19 (1978); WOLFRAM, supra note 73, at
69-70 (1986) (arguing that the transition from the Canon to the Code to the Rules has
marked a separation of ethics from the rules regulating lawyers); Mary C. Daly, The
Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the Differences in
Perceptions of Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1117 (1999) (arguing that the transition from the Canons to the Code to
the Rules has marked a transition from standards to rules); Hazard, Future of Ethics, supra
note 73, at 1249-52. The Rules' elimination of the Code's ethical norms, and their
increasingly legalistic approach, was not free from controversy at the time of drafting. See
RULES LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 100, at 354 (listing the arguments of opponents
of the Restatement format); Alexander Unkovic, The Current Format of the Code of
Professional Responsibility Should Be Amended, Not Abandoned to Accommodate the
Need for Change, 26 VILL. L. REV. 1191 (1981) (chiding those who are quick to criticize
the Code), and has continued to be criticized. See, e.g., Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost:
Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1279-
1303 (1998) (arguing that the Code and the Rules show the emergence of a "regulatory
approach" to legal ethics and criticizing this approach); Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics
Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80 IOWA L. REV. 901, 905-10
,(1995) (arguing that the alterations in lawyer self-regulation reflects the emergence of a
"positivist" approach to legal ethics and criticizing this approach).
103. As noted above, by 1972 all but three States had either adopted, or were adopting,
the Code. Eventually, forty-nine states adopted the Code with few or no changes. See
Duncan T. O'Brien, Multistate Practice and Conflicting Ethical Obligations, 16 SETON
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the beginnings of various reform efforts began almost immediately."
The contentious debates over the Code, the Rules, and the
subsequent reform efforts of Ethics 2000159 clearly demonstrate the
challenges of proposing minimum standards of behavior to a self-
regulated profession. The Bar's ever-increasing attention to the ease
of compliance is based partially in the somewhat palatable goals of
clarity and predictability, but it is also certainly motivated by self-
interest. 6 The clashes over these minimum Rules and the concurrent
arrival of the latest series of professionalism crises are not unrelated
events. To the contrary, they are the natural culmination of almost a
century's effort to free the legal profession of any broader ethical
requirements or even any duty to perform ethical deliberations.107
HALL L. REV. 678, 679 (1986); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L.
REV. 335, 339 (1994). By contrast, only two states had adopted the Rules by 1984. See
WOLFRAM, supra note 73, at 63 & n.87; see also BLUEPRINT, supra note 4, at 258 ("The
proposed Model Rules proved to be more controversial than the model code had been.").
The Rules have now been adopted, with varying levels of alteration, in forty-four states.
See Center for Professional Responsibility, Dates of Adoption of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha_states.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Rule 1.6, which controls
lawyer confidentiality, has been the most modified provision. See Moulton, supra note 93,
at 91-92. For an overview of the state-by-state alterations, see ABA/BNA, LAWYERS
MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr 01:3 to 01:49 (2004); Moulton, supra note 93, at
91-96.
104. For example, the establishment of the ABA's Commission on Professionalism was
authorized in December 1984, a little more than a year after the ABA's adoption of the
Rules and well before the Rules were widely accepted by the States. See BLUEPRINT,
supra note 4, at 248.
105. For an overview of the work of the ABA Committee charged with drafting the
Ethics 2000 changes, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
106. Consider, for example, Ethics 2000's careful consideration of potential disciplinary
enforcement issues and the application of the Rules in malpractice suits. Redrafters of
Ethics 2000 considered adding a non-binding "best practices" introduction to Ethics 2000,
but ultimately rejected the idea out of a fear that the best practices might be used in
malpractice actions. See Mona L. Hymel, Controlling Lawyer Behavior: The Sources and
Uses of Protocols in Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 878 & n.38 (2002);
Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 701 & n.187 (2001);
Cf Robert J. Kraemer, Attorney-Client Conundrum: The Use of Arbitration Agreements
for Legal Malpractice in Texas, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 909, 921-22 n.70 (2002) (noting that
Ethics 2000 allows lawyers to require arbitration of legal malpractice claims under Rule
1.8(h) for the first time). In short, Ethics 2000 is just the latest example of lawyer
regulators worrying more about lawyers' interests (avoiding malpractice liability) than
client or societal interests.
107. My friend and reviewer, Professor Chris Sagers criticizes my lapse into "post hoc
ergo propter hoc" causation here, and argues that at best I have established a correlation
between any crisis and the change in regulation, and at worst I have established nothing.
While I appreciate the superfluous Latin, I respectfully disagree. First, my analysis does
not require that I prove any causation per se, it is enough to argue that my proposed
regulatory structure would better address any perceived crisis. Second, while I agree that I
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Lawyer regulators have now abandoned the unified original goal
of the Canons and the legal ethics project-to define the moral,
ethical, and practical boundaries of lawyering-and are now
compelled to pursue two different and conflicting goals
simultaneously.
II. THE PERILS OF DUAL GOALS
This Part argues that lawyer regulators undercut both the
minimalist and the broadly ethical projects as they attempt to proceed
in two directions at once. Current lawyer regulation has relegated the
broadly ethical aspect of legal ethics to hortatory "professionalism"
efforts and continuously narrowed the minimum standards of
behavior in the minimalist project. It is interesting to note at the
outset, however, that lawyer regulators do not always admit that there
are two competing goals at work. These two goals are often treated
as if they are identical, or at least overlapping.
A. The Ironic Uses of "Legal Ethics" and "Professionalism"
The confusion of goals can be best seen in the use of
terminology. The word "ethics" has long since been wiped out of the
official standards of minimum behaviors, starting with the
replacement of the Canons of Professional Ethics by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and later the Rules of Professional
Conduct."8 Many (if not most) law schools have renamed their legal
ethics course "Legal Profession" or "Professional Responsibility.""1 9
These linguistic choices reflect a particular truth: the Rules that now
govern lawyer conduct are not rules of ethics.
Nevertheless, lawyer regulators and lawyers have yet to
eliminate the phrase "legal ethics" from their lexicon. To the
contrary, in legal parlance "legal ethics" has become synonymous
with the minimum rules governing attorney conduct.110 In light of the
have not proven sole causation, I do think that the regulatory history coupled with an
analysis of current regulatory weakness does allow a claim of more than mere correlation.
See infra Section II.
108. See David Luban & Michael Milleman, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark
Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 31, 45 (1995) (noting the loss of the charged words
"canons" and "ethics" from the ABA's standards). I am always puzzled when I consider
the replacement of the word "responsibility" with "conduct." As a linguistic and ethical
matter it is an extremely bad sign that the Rules that govern your profession are so narrow
that the word "responsibility" is considered too strong and must be replaced by "conduct."
109. Cf. AALS, THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 2003-04 1370-78 (2003)
(listing professors who teach "legal profession," with no separate entry for legal ethics).
110. See JUSTICES ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at 18 ("Professionalism is a much
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explicitly moral use of "ethics" in common parlance,"' the application
of the phrase "legal ethics" to minimum rules carries substantial
interpretive freight. The phrase "legal ethics" imbues the Rules with
a depth and a meaning they no longer have.
In a further unlikely turn of nomenclature, professionalism has
come to embody what a lawyer "should" do, i.e., professionalism has
come to cover a lawyer's ethical duties." 2 The dictionary and
common parlance meaning of professionalism, however, is devoid of
any moral significance; it simply embodies the "qualities or features,
as competence, skill, etc., characteristic of a profession or a
professional. 113
Some of this confusion can be explained historically. Starting in
the nineteenth century lawyers and legal academics first began to
separate the category of "legal ethics" from natural law or religious
morality, and to discuss the particular kind of ethical duties that might
arise in legal practice.1 14  The original "legal ethics" were thus
explicitly moral and ethical, as were the first official statements of
legal ethics by various bar associations. Nevertheless, the term lost its
moorings and meaning as the legalistic minimums of lawyer behavior
broader concept than legal ethics .... Ethics rules are what a lawyer must obey."); Leslie
P. Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1253, 1253-54 (1998) ("Legal ethics usually focuses on lawyers' professional
standards, standards promulgated in codes or rules that are adopted by state legislatures
and bar associations."); William Wesley Patton, Legislative Regulation of Dependency
Court Attorneys: Public Relations and Separation of Powers, 24 J. LEGIS. 3, 4 (1998)
(distinguishing the public's definition of legal ethics from the profession's: "Apparently,
while many lawyers view ethics as the absence of disciplinary measures and adherence to
the profession's own Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the public views ethical
conduct on a much broader scope, to include things such as fee disputes, lack of client
relations and communication problems.") (quoting Gary A. Hengster, Vox Populi: The
Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, 79. A.B.A. J, 60, 62 (Sept. 1993)); Joseph P.
Tomain & Barbara G. Watts, Between Law and Virtue, 71 U. CINC. L. REV. 585, 610
(2002) ("Clearly, professionalism is a concept broader than legal ethics.").
111. See OXFORD, supra note 32, at 856.
112. See, e.g., BLUEPRINT, supra note 4, at 261-62; LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM,
supra note 24, at 10 ("The bottom line is that the concepts and values underlying lawyer
professionalism are aspirational in nature and unlike the minimum standard ethical
disciplinary rules the govern lawyers' conduct."); Frank X. Neuner, Jr., Professionalism:
Charting a Different Course for the New Millennium, 73 TUL. L. REV. 2041, 2042 (1999)
("The basic distinction between ethics and professionalism is that rules of ethics tell us
what we must do and professionalism tells us what we should do.").
113. See OXFORD, supra note 32, at 2368.
114. The study and discussion of legal ethics as a distinct topic in America has been
traced to two nineteenth-century law professors: David Hoffman and George Sharswood.
See Altman, supra note 68, at 2422-36 (discussing the influences of Hoffman and
Sharswood on the ABA's 1908 Canons of Ethics); supra notes 61-66 and accompanying
text.
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replaced the moral or ethical. The term endures, however, because
either consciously or unconsciously the legal profession is unwilling to
relinquish the connection between the Rules and some broader
conception of "legal ethics. 115
This linguistic sleight of hand is emblematic of the general
conflation in goals and terminology of lawyer regulators. While it is
clear that the minimalist goal is quite distinct from the broadly ethical
goal, lawyer regulators regularly blur the lines between the two. This
conflation serves three purposes. First, it allows lawyers to use ethical
nomenclature when discussing the Rules with other lawyers or clients.
I know a plaintiff's lawyer who regularly explains to his clients that he
cannot "ethically" pay any "financial assistance" to a client ahead of
an expected recovery.116 This turn of phrase allows the lawyer to turn
a purely regulatory prohibition (and a rather self-interested one at
that)'17 into an "ethical" duty for purposes of client relations and
moral gravitas.118
Second, it draws attention away from the elimination of the
ethical and moral from the Rules and avoids the uncomfortable
reality of the minimalist nature of the Rules. Third, it allows
regulators to give some real substance to their professionalism efforts.
They accomplish this feat by treating their minimalist program as part
and parcel of professionalism, so that all of the activities associated
with the minimum rules can be credited as an attempt to raise the
115. 1 refer to the use of the phrase "legal ethics" as a vestigial organ of the legal
profession. "Legal ethics" themselves no longer do any real work on the body of the
profession, but, like an appendix, the concept still lingers on.
116. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2004); see also Lester
Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price
Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65, 119-21 (2003) (discussing and criticizing Rule
1.8(e) as against client interests). Cf Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of
Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
653, 699-703 (2003) (arguing that the effective hourly rate of contingency-fee lawyers
establishes that the market is non-competitive).
117. See James E. Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rational: The "Acquisition of an
Interest and Financial Assistance in Litigation" Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223, 243-
57 (2003) (dismissing the stated justifications for the Rule and arguing for its abolition or
substantial revision).
118. Consider also the prevalent use of the phrase "highest standards of ethical
conduct" to describe the requirements of the Rules. See, e.g., Dennis Archer, Keynote
Address: Why is Accountability Important?, 54 S.C. L. REV. 881, 885 (2003) ("[T]he ABA
will also continue to review and update the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to
ensure that we hold lawyers to the highest ethical standards .... ); Allen T. Eaton &
La'Vern D. Wiley, Litigating Medical Malpractice Claims: Ethical Traps in Investigating a
Case, A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., June 5-7, 2003, available at Westlaw,
SH098 ALI-ABA 393 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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ethical standards of the profession. 119 Without the minimalist efforts,
the professionalism project is a much less impressive collection of
non-mandatory activities. 12  The phrase "legal ethics" also allows
lawyer regulators to imbue the minimalist project with moral heft.
For example, the ABA trumpeted the announcement of the Ethics
2000 campaign (which focused mainly on reformulations of the
minimum rules) as a crucial move towards "taking professionalism
seriously" and the "advancement of the legal profession to a higher
moral ground.' 1
21
Regardless of this linguistic and programmatic confusion, an
analysis of the bar's regulatory efforts since the demise of the Canons
shows that lawyer regulators have eliminated a single goal in favor of
two distinct and occasionally inapposite goals. I first argue that the
bar's broadly ethical efforts greatly undermine the likelihood that the
legal profession will follow the Rules of Professional Conduct. I next
maintain that the focus on the minimalist project likewise cripples the
broadly ethical effort.
B. The Broadly Ethical Project May Be More Influential Than
Previously Realized-It May Be Undermining the Rules of
Professional Conduct
There have been a number of recent studies and articles on the
unhappiness and disillusionment of practicing lawyers 122 and law
students. 23 Some have argued that law school itself causes student
119. See, e.g., JUSTICES ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at 25-39 (listing activities
primarily related to enforcing and teaching the minimal Rules among professionalism
initiatives).
120. See infra notes 153-63 and accompanying text.
121. Jerome J. Shestack, Taking Professionalism Seriously, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998 at 70,
70-72.
122. See, e.g. RHODE, INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 23-48 (discussing the legal
profession's many discontents); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics in Practice, in ETHICS IN
PRACTICE 4-8 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000) (detailing the economics of legal practice,
and their deleterious effect upon lawyer happiness); David A. Kessler, Professional
Asphyxiation: Why the Legal Profession is Gasping for Breath, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
455, 457-77 (1997) (delineating some of the socioeconomic, political, and institutional
factors in lawyer unhappiness); Patrick J. Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical
Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 881-
88 (1999) (describing multiple studies showing deep lawyer unhappiness). But see John P.
Heinz et. al., Lawyers and Their Discontents: Findings from a Survey of the Chicago Bar,
74 IND. L.J. 735 (1999) (reporting that survey of the Chicago Bar found relatively high job
satisfaction).
123. See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, BROKEN CONTRACT 236-38 (1992) (observing
that Harvard Law School stripped the author of his idealism and commitment to social
justice); Thomas D. Eisele, Bitter Knowledge: Socrates and Teaching by Disillusionment,
45 MERCER L. REV. 587, 620 (1994) (observing that Socratic teaching results in student
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disillusionment and cynicism,124 and some have postulated that the
current approach to legal ethics has increased student cynicism.
125
One reason that law students, lawyers and law professors are
growing cynical about "legal ethics" is the gap between the minimum
standards of lawyer conduct and the broader conceptions embodied
by professionalism. 126 Although there are both narrow and broad127
disillusionment); James R.P. Ogloff, et al., More Than "Learning to Think Like a Lawyer":
The Empirical Research on Legal Education, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 73, 94-97 (2000)
(summarizing studies questioning students before and during law school, and finding
growing dissatisfaction).
124. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer Know Thyself: A Review of Empirical Research on
Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1386-87 & nn.
293-301 (1997) (listing examples of studies showing increased law student cynicism during
law school); Robert Granfield, Constructing Professional Boundaries in Law School:
Reactions of Students and Implications for Teachers, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD.
53, 68-71 (1994) (reporting Harvard students' reaction to law school as encouraging
cynicism about the law and lawyering); Timothy L. Hall, Moral Character, The Practice of
Law, and Legal Education, 60 Miss. L.J. 511, 535-41 (1990) (noting that law students are
treated as "moral skeletons," stripped of the moral faculties and dispositions that give life
substance); Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law
School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 449, 455-65 (1996) (noting
criticism of traditional law school teaching methodology with its emphasis on logic and
reason and devaluation of personal values and moral conviction creates cynicism); see also
DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY
(1983) (describing law school's role in increasing law student cynicism); B.A. Glesner, Fear
and Loathing in the Law Schools, 23 U. CONN. L. REV. 627, 627-30 (1991) (same).
125. One recent study of recent law school graduates found that new lawyers struggle
mightily with the ethical and moral elements of their jobs and either find the Rules to be
inapplicable or even to require immorality in the name of zealous advocacy. Clark D.
Cunningham, How to Explain Confidentiality?, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 579, 591 (2003)
(noting that structuring professional responsibility class around "lawyers who were villains
.4. increased an already troubling level of law-school-induced cynicism"); Robert
Granfield & Thomas Koenig, "It's Hard to be a Human Being and a Lawyer": Young
Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W. VA. L.
REV. 495, 495-96, 508-19 (2003); see also ABEL, supra note 26, at 143 & n.8 ("Indeed,
there is evidence that law school makes students more cynical about legal ethics.").
126. The connection between professionalism and ethics or morals is sometimes based
in a historical reference, see KRONMAN, supra note 30, or by a call to shared professional
or societal values, Bruce A. Green, Public Declarations of Professionalism, 52 S.C. L. REV.
729, 737 n.18 (2001) ("It may fairly be argued that most, if not all, of the values
conventionally associated with professionalism are simply common values given specific
application in the context of legal practice."); Jeffrey M. Vincent, Aspirational Morality:
The Ideals of Professionalism-Part II, 15 UTAH B.J. 24, 24 (2002) ("Besides a knowledge
of and ability to apply principles of the law, the general conception of legal
professionalism includes loftier ideals-certain shared moral values-that imply a duty to
act in the public good and with the purpose of obtaining justice. Dean Roscoe Pound
described the profession as 'a group ... pursuing a learned art in the spirit of public
service.' "), or by a more complex philosophical approach. See generally LUBAN, supra
note 38 (presenting a devastating argument against the "dominant view" lawyer role
morality and presenting the "people's lawyer" as a palatable alternative); SIMON, supra
note 9.
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conceptions of professionalism, the entire project has an overtly
ethical-moral dimension that draws a sharp distinction between the
minimum Rules of Professional Conduct and ethics writ large.
This distinction encourages cynicism in five interlocking ways.
First, a comparison between even the least robust personal version of
morality and the minimum requirements of the Rules leads inevitably
to the reaction "is that all there is to being an ethical lawyer? 12
Second, and more depressingly, many practicing lawyers disregard
even the minimal Rules we have. 129 Third, actual enforcement of the
Rules is relatively rare.13° Fourth, there is an inherent sadness to the
127. Professionalism has meant as little as simple civility. See Kathleen P. Brown, A
Critique of the Civility Movement: Why Rambo Will Not Go Away, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 751,
754-55 (1994) (equating professionalism with civility); Morgan, supra note 41, at 45
(noting that some have attempted to define "professionalism" as "civility"); Kara Ann
Nagorney, Note, A Noble Profession? A Discussion of Civility Among Lawyers, 12 GEO. J.
LEG. ETHICS 815, 816 (1999) ("Civility is professionalism."). Professionalism has meant as
much as William Simon's "contextual judgment." See SIMON, supra note 9, at 109-37
(arguing that the key to legal professionalism is the "experience of work as the vindication
of general norms in particular contexts, of simultaneous social commitment and self-
expression, and of groundedness conjoined with creativity."); William H. Simon, The
Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 65-66 (1991) ("The attractive
implication of this notion of professionalism is that lawyers, not just in exceptional
moments of public service, but in their everyday practice, participate directly in furthering
justice,"). Professionalism has also meant as much as Deborah Rhode's call for lawyers
"to accept personal moral responsibility for the consequences of their professional acts."
See RHODE, INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 17. But at a minimum, professionalism attempts
to reach outside of the mandatory Rules to reach a broader conception of morality.
128. See, e.g., Nathan M. Crystal, The Incompleteness of the Model Rules and the
Development of Professional Standards, 52 MERCER L. REV. 839, 844 (2001) ("[T]he
Model Rules are an incomplete source of professional obligations because they contain
disciplinary rules rather than aspirational guidance ...."); Stephen Gillers, What We
Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46
OHIO STATE L. J. 243, 247-48 (1985) (arguing that Model Rules cover so little ground that
they fail to express any real statement of legal ethics); James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds
and Moral Seismography, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 781, 795-96 (1997) (describing rise of
aspirational creeds in response to shortcomings of the Model Rules). The rules
themselves recognize that they do not "exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that
should inform a lawyer." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble: Scope (2004).
129. See, e.g., RHODE, INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 168-83 (describing problems with
lawyer over-billing); Richard H. Underwood, The Professional and the Liar, 87 KY. L.J.
919, 937-38 (1999) (arguing that Rules covering perjured testimony and attorney lying are
rarely followed); Zacharias, supra note 47, at 984-87 (describing regular, unpunished
violations of the lawyer advertising Rules). See generally Bruce A. Green, Lawyer
Discipline: Conscientious Noncompliance, Conscious Avoidance, and Prosecutorial
Discretion, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1307 (1998) (discussing regular lawyer noncompliance
with the Rules).
130. See RHODE, INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 158-65 (describing infrequency and
general leniency of bar sanctions); Levin, supra note 47, at 38-59 (same); see also Griffin,
supra note 110, at 1102 (noting that clients are waiting for "a disciplinary system that
effectively sanctions lawyers for their neglect of clients' matters").
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abandonment of the broadly ethical.' Lastly, and paradoxically, all
of the attention and reform efforts showered on the professionalism
project have created the aforementioned self-fulfilling cycle of
perceived crisis, inadequate solution, sense of failure, and further
cries of crisis. Observing this cycle certainly fosters a sense of
cynicism and despair. In sum, there is a significant tension between
the ideals and study of legal ethics and professionalism and the reality
and purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct. This tension has
a corrosive effect on the entire project: as the Rules get narrower
(and therefore easier to follow and enforce) the sense of a shared
professional ethic or a broader set of norms is devalued and may
eventually be destroyed.132
Moreover, the decision of lawyer regulators to separate the
moral from the minimal in the drafting of the Code and the Rules,
and then reintroduce the moral in a series of non-binding
"professionalism" efforts, further lessens the likelihood that lawyers
will follow the baseline prohibitions. There is voluminous literature
describing the connection or overlap between commonly held
morality and the law. Among the most influential work is the debate
between Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart.'33 Professor Fuller argued
131. Consider for example, David Luban and Michael Milleman's discussion of the
rationalization of legal ethics and Weberian sociology:
Max Weber wrote that "the fate of our times is characterized by rationalization
and intellectualization and, above all, by the disenchantment of the world."
Rationalization, to Weber, meant the process by which ever-growing portions of
the world-the physical world, but also the social world-are brought under
rational and technical control; it is also the process by which non-rational norms
are gradually purged from the world. Prominent among these norms are public
ideals and moral constraints on the effective pursuit of one's preferred ends, and
the phrase "the disenchantment of the world" refers in part to our reinterpretation
of the physical and social worlds as reflections of rational, non-magical and
normatively antiseptic forces.
Luban & Milleman, supra note 108, at 34 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Max Weber,
Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 155 (Hans Gerth &
C. Wright Mills eds., 1946)).
132. Cf STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE EMPEROR OF OCEAN PARK 228 (2002) (observing
that as society grows uncomfortable talking about a particular moral tenet, "within a
generation or two nobody will think it either. What survives is only what we are able to
communicate. Moral knowledge that remains secret eventually ceases to be knowledge.").
133. See generally H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958) (defending the critical distinction between morality and the
law). But see Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630, 644-48 (1957) (advocating "the morality of law itself" and rejecting
Hart's distinction between law and morality). For general commentary on the Hart/Fuller
debate, see, e.g., ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK,
AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 150-58 (2000); Joseph Mendola, Hart, Fuller, Dworkin
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vociferously that at its most fundamental level law was based in, and
relied upon, a broad conception of common morality."' Hart rejected
this explicit connection and argued that while law and morality
intersect, law is not dependent upon morality in its creation or
validity. 135
For purposes of this Article, however, the philosophical question
of whether law itself derives from, or is legitimized by, morality is
unnecessary. Most agree that when law and morality intersect, the
law is at its most powerful and persuasive, and is most likely to be
followed. For example, both Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart agree that,
logistically, law works best when it jibes with commonly held
morals.136 As applied to criminal law there is general accord that an
intersection of law and morality makes enforcement easier and
compliance more likely.'37 Figure One uses a Venn diagram to show
and Fragile Norms, 52 S.M.U. L. REV. 111, 111-121 (1999).
134. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed. 1969)
(detailing "the morality that makes law possible").
135. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155-212 (2d. ed. 1994) (arguing for a
distinction among law, justice, and morality).
136. See Fuller, supra note 133, at 639 ("Fundamental Rules derive their efficacy from
a general acceptance, which in turn rests ultimately on a perception that they are right and
necessary."); id. at 644 ("Good order is law that corresponds to the demands of justice, or
morality, or men's notions of what ought to be."); HART, supra note 135, at 82-91 (noting
that when the "primary rules" are accepted from an "internal" view, i.e., morally, most
people will obey the law regardless of punishment).
137. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 15 (1998)
("[The] more law conforms to prevailing moral opinions ... the easier it is for lay people
to understand and comply with law. The people subject to the law can avoid coming into
conflict with it just by acting the part of well-socialized members of their community.");
Richard A. Epstein, Crime and Tort. Old Wine in New Bottles, in ASSESSING THE
CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 231, 247-48 (Randy
E. Barnett & John Hagel III eds., 1977) ("The criminal law works best when it deals with
conduct of the defendant that the law thinks worthy of moral condemnation ...."); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193-94 (1991) ("The
criminal law is obeyed not simply because there is a legal threat underlying it, but because
the public perceives its norms to be legitimate and deserving of compliance."); Joshua
Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress." Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper
Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1338 n.36 (1989) ("[Any society that allows its rules of
criminal responsibility to diverge too far from such deeply held moral feelings runs the
unacceptable risk of severing the criminal law from its moral underpinnings and
jeopardizing its moral legitimacy and practical efficacy."); Jerome Hall, Interrelations of
Criminal Law and Torts, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 771 (1943) ("The most defensible
position, stated broadly, is that the more general doctrines of the criminal law are founded
on principles of moral culpability"); Robert F. Schopp, Wake Up and Die Right: The
Rationale, Standard, and Jurisprudential Significance of the Competency to Face Execution
Requirement, 51 LA. L. REV. 995, 1015 (1991) ("To the extent that the criminal law and
conventional social morality diverge, members of the society are less likely to attach
personal sanctions on the basis of illegality ... weakening allegiance to [the criminal law]
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the overlap between morality and the criminal law, with the area of
overlap between the two noted as the area of "maximum efficacy."
The bulk of criminal law falls within the "maximum efficacy"
boundaries: regardless of governmental enforcement, the great
majority of citizens will follow the law. This makes these prohibitions
more effective and easier to enforce. 38
The area where criminal law diverges from morality has
alternatively been named "regulatory offenses" or "malum
prohibitum crimes."' 39 Commentators have argued that the law has
begun to "overcriminalize" and that the "malum prohibitum"
category is ever growing.14  Enforcement in this category is much
more challenging, since the average citizen may feel unconstrained by
moral obligation and base her conduct upon the odds of being
caught.' 4' Therefore, many more people speed on a deserted road
than drive drunk. Part of the explanation for this phenomenon is the
penalties involved, but much of it is the moral opprobrium currently
associated with drunk driving. 42
and decreasing voluntary compliance."). Cf ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 273-74 (1986) (arguing that
self-sanctions and social sanctions may prevent crime more effectively than punishment
and enforcement agents). But cf Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a
Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY
L.J. 1533, 1592 n.192 (1997) (mentioning studies and maintaining that "at least for strongly
socialized individuals, the threat of sanctions is essentially irrelevant, even in the case of
malum prohibitum-type violations. For such individuals, moral values and peer pressure
are such powerful inhibitors that they preclude the possibility that the motivation to break
the law will even be felt.").
138. Dan Kahan has argued, however, that a critical element of criminal law's
deterrent effect is the attempt to actually change societal norms, i.e., to move crimes from
the malum prohibitum category to the "maximum efficacy" category. See Dan M. Kahan,
The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1999).
139. See Green, supra note 137, at 1556-57 ("The terms 'public welfare,' 'strict
liability,' 'malum prohibitum,' 'petty infractions,' 'economic,' 'white collar,' and
'regulatory' all have been used to refer to a group of crimes claimed to be lacking in moral
content."); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96
MICH. L. REV. 127, 129 (1998) ("Crimes of this sort are often referred to as malum
prohibitum-wrong because prohibited-and are distinguished from crimes that are
malum in se-wrong in themselves independent of law."). See generally BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 960 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "malum prohibitum" as "a thing which is wrong
because prohibited; an act which is not inherently immoral, but becomes so because its
commission is expressly forbidden by positive law .... ").
140. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 137, at 197 (noting commentators' warnings about the
danger of overcriminalization, especially regarding actions that are not morally
reprehensible).
141. There is some evidence, however, that the moral authority of the law is enough
that some will not break even an irrational or amoral law, simply because of the powerful
norm against violating any law. See Green, supra note 137, at 1591-93.
142. Drunk driving is a particularly apt example because over the last thirty years or so
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The above analysis is highly probative when considering the
current approach to lawyer regulation. Bar disciplinary procedures
have generally been considered quasi-criminal in nature, 44 and the
it has moved from the malum prohibitum category to the maximum efficacy category.
While enforcement and penalties have been increased, there has been an accompanying
moral attack on drunk driving. See, e.g., Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Homepage, at
http://www.madd.org/home/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2004) (delineating efforts to raise the
social opprobrium associated with driving drunk) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
143. The upper circle represents commonly held morality; the lower circle, the criminal
law. The non-overlapping section of the morality circle is titled "societal norms." For a
general discussion of how societal norms, and not the government or laws, govern the
great bulk of our activities, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). Figure One is a Venn diagram. For a general
discussion of these helpful diagrams, see SUN-JOO SHIN, THE LOGICAL STATUS OF
DIAGRAMS 16-20 (1994); Nancy B. Rapoport, "Venn" and the Art of Shared Governance,
35 U. TOL. L. REV. 169, 176 (2003) (describing Venn diagrams generally and using one to
show the overlap of "faculty jurisdiction" and "decanal jurisdiction" for law school
governance); Stewart J. Schwab, Limited-Domain Positivism as an Empirical Proposition,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 1111, 1112-14 (1997) (using a Venn diagram to show the overlap
between morality and law, and to depict the debate between positivism and natural law).
144. The seminal case is In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-51 (1967) (holding that the
Due Process Clause applies to disbarment hearings and that they are "adversary
proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature"). Ruffalo has not ended the story, however, as
some courts hold that disbarment proceedings are "quasi-criminal." See Statewide
Grievance Comm. v. Botwick, 627 A.2d 901, 906 (Conn. 1993); Levi v. Mississippi State
Bar, 436 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1983). Others hold that they are "neither civil nor
criminal," (which may mean the same thing). Yokozeki v. State Bar, 521 P.2d 858, 865
(Cal. 1974); ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, STANDARDS FOR
IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 20 (1991) ("Sanctions in disciplinary matters are neither
criminal nor civil but sui generic .... ). Still others hold that disciplinary actions can be
civil in nature. See In re Disciplinary Action Against Hawkins, 623 N.W. 2d 431, 437-38
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Rules of Professional Conduct have been described as "quasi-
criminal 145 or "statutory. '146 The choice of the drafters of the Code
and the Rules to focus upon clearly defined minimum standards was,
in fact, an explicit reaction to the prospect of disciplinary actions
based upon the ABA's Canons.147
Therefore, the question is where the Rules leave us in Figure
One. At the outset of the ABA's legal ethics program, the Canons of
Legal Ethics fell largely within the category of generally held norms
or morals.148  The original Canons were chiefly meant to be a
statement of commonly held principles. Nevertheless, the decisions
of courts applying the Canons in disciplinary situations certainly
established the Canons as more than common morality and as
enforceable standards. Because the Canons were drafted for general
ethical purposes, they generally fell within the "maximum efficacy"
category: lawyers felt both morally and legally obliged to follow
them.
(N.D. 2001) (holding that Ruffalo does not require a quasi-criminal proceeding and that
disciplinary proceedings can be civil in nature). For a longer discussion of the confusion
on this point, see Levin, supra note 47, at 19 & n.83. For an overview of modern
disciplinary procedure, see Geoffrey C. Hazard & Cameron Beard, A Lawyer's Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in Professional Disciplinary Proceedings, 96 YALE L.J. 1060,
1065-68 (1987). For a comparison of criminal processes with bar disciplinary processes,
see Zacharias, supra note 24, at 690-92.
145. See Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7,
14-16 (1989) (arguing that the Model Rules are "quasi-criminal" and take the legal
profession to a new "fourth-level" of professional status); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Irony of
Lawyers' Justice in America, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857, 1867-68 (2002) ("The best our
thinkers and drafters have been able to do... has been to remove the language of ethics,
to call our flabby moral consensus 'professional responsibility,' and to pare our rules down
to quasi-criminal law."). But cf Nancy J. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in the
Twenty-First Century, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 923, 927 & n.31 (2002) (quoting, but then
partially disavowing her previous statement: "I do not believe, however, that all of the
standards either in the current Model Rules or in the [Ethics 20001 Commission's
proposed amendments are so clear that they constitute merely a 'quasi-criminal code.' ").
146. See Hazard, supra note 73, at 1254 (describing the language of the Rules as
"statutory"); Feldman, supra note 43, at 888-89 (noting that the Rules "self-consciously
emulate the style, structure, and language of modern civil and criminal statutory codes.").
147. See Armstrong, supra note 62, at 1069 (stating that the drafting committees' goal
in designing the Code was specifically designed to make it "capable of enforcement" and
to "facilitate more effective disciplinary action"); Levine, Ethics Codes, supra note 93, at
530-31; Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in
Legal Ethics, 80 IOWA L. REV. 901, 908 (1995) (noting that the need for an enforceable
Code sparked the creation of the Code).
148. Some notable exceptions are the Canons governing specific instances of banned
conduct, like Canons 13, 27, and 28 dealing with business creation and advertising.
Interestingly, these Canons proved the most controversial, while the broadly moral
statements generally remained unchanged until the adoption of the Code. See supra notes
89-95 and accompanying text.
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The adoption of the Code began to break down this conjunction
of moral and legal obligation by dividing the minimums from the
broader conception of ethical lawyering. Nevertheless, the Code at
least attempted to make the connection between commonly held legal
ethics and the minimum rules. Because the Code sought to address
the whole process of being a lawyer its authors could honestly claim
that it "define[d] the type of ethical conduct that the public has a right
to expect ... of lawyers." '149
The Rules of Professional Conduct, however, are explicitly a
series of "Model Rules" in the "restatement format.' 150 The bulk of
these Rules are so narrow and so divorced from their original ethical
context, that the Rules clearly have lost the over-riding moral suasion
that accompanied the Canons and even the Code. Lawyer regulators
are thus inviting lawyers to obey the Rules based upon the likelihood
of enforcement rather than as a statement of shared moral values.
There are, however, clearly activities barred by the Rules that
most lawyers would recognize as violations of a commonly held
morality. Stealing from a client, lying to a court, or abandoning your
clients all fit in this category. Interestingly, these are exactly the types
of violations that actually result in disbarment or license
suspension, 5' so the moral authority supporting these Rules actually
coincides with the possibility of enforcement.
The focus upon enforcement for the non-moral Rules, however,
casts serious doubt upon the likelihood of lawyer compliance.
Lawyer disciplinary authorities are notoriously underfunded, and
actual enforcement of anything beyond substantial violations of the
Rules is relatively rare. 152 As such, any focus upon enforcement will
149. See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY preliminary
statement (1982).
150. See Robert W. Meserve, Chairperson's Introduction, in ABA COMPENDIUM OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULES AND STANDARDS 9 (1997).
151. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV.
589, 641 n.168 (1985) (reporting results of a survey of public discipline in three
jurisdictions and finding that "[o]f the cited offenses, one-third involved neglect. Most of
the other offenses concerned commingling (17%), misrepresentation (17%), and criminal
convictions (16%)"); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 22 (1992) ("The severity of taking away a person's livelihood made disbarment
appropriate only in cases of truly reprehensible conduct, and, conversely, such conduct
carried a sufficient moral stigma to justify ouster from the profession.").
152. The ABA itself has concluded that attorney discipline is, and always has been, a
neglected area. See RHODE, INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 158-65 (quoting ABA research
finding that the public thinks the attorney discipline system is "[1oo slow, too secret, too
soft, and too self-regulated" and discussing possible reforms); ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON
EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (1970) [hereinafter CLARK REPORT] (Describing
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likely result in reduced compliance.
C. The Pursuit of Ever-Narrower Rules Likewise Undercuts the
Goals of the Broadly Ethical Project
The regulatory goal of narrowing the Rules to a theoretically
enforceable, quasi-criminal code undercuts the goals of the generally
non-enforceable broadly ethical project in several ways. First, in
considering the relationship of the mandatory to the hortatory, I
always consider how my two-year-old daughter reacts to requests of
each kind. The mandatory is followed depending on mood and the
perceived odds of effective punishment, while the hortatory is
generally disregarded out of hand.153 The bifurcation of legal ethics,
with one portion labeled mandatory and another voluntary, places the
broadly ethical at a tremendous disadvantage in terms of importance
to the bar, attention from individual lawyers, and consideration in law
school classes.
Second, by choosing the "familiar" restatement format for the
attorney discipline as "a scandalous situation that requires the immediate attention of the
profession. With few exceptions, the prevailing attitude of lawyers toward disciplinary
enforcement ranges from apathy to outright hostility. Disciplinary action is practically
nonexistent in many jurisdictions .... ); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY:
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT xv-xx
(1992) [hereinafter MCKAY REPORT] (noting positive changes since the Clark report, but
listing additional necessary steps for improvement). Attorney discipline is underfunded.
See MCKAY REPORT, supra, at xviii (detecting that the funding and staffing of disciplinary
committees "have not kept pace with the growth of the profession," and that "some
agencies are so underfunded and understaffed that they offer little protection against
unethical lawyers"); Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the
Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 485 (1993) ("[B]ecause many disciplinary offices
are underfunded... disciplinary authorities generally decline to proceed against attorneys
who perform incompetently except where they are guilty of the grossest neglect."); Susan
P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1121
(1996) ("[D]isciplinary boards are notoriously underfunded and [are] unable or reluctant
to mount the effort needed to do battle with wealthy class action lawyers and powerful
members of the defense bar"). There are backlogs for investigations. See Lisa J. Frisella
et al., State Bar of California, 17 CAL. REG. L. REP. 339, 343 (2001) ("In his initial
February 1999 report, Justice Lui reported that the Bar's discipline system faces an
unprecedented backlog of over 7,000 open complaints and reports against attorneys from
consumers and courts."). See generally Mark E. Hopkins, Open Attorney Discipline: New
Jersey Supreme Court's Decision to Make Attorney Disciplinary Procedures Public-What
it Means to Attorneys and to the Public, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 757 (1996) (noting a backlog in
New Jersey disciplinary cases in the 1980s).
153. I realize that lawyers are likely to differ in substantial ways from a two-year-old
(for example, lawyers may have better and more developed excuses for their misconduct),
but the two-year-old example helps to clarify the reactions one can expect to mandatory
and non-binding requests.
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mandatory Rules.54 the drafters are actually triggering a very specific
set of lawyer thought processes, or heuristics. A heuristic is a mental
shortcut the brain uses to find order and make decisions in multi-
faceted situations. 55 Heuristics are particularly important to the legal
profession. Law schools regularly boast that they do not simply teach
the law, they actually teach a series of heuristics, i.e., how to "think
like a lawyer.' ' 56 At bottom the critical skill that a lawyer sells is her
brain and a specialized bundle of thought-processes and heuristics.
Many clients think that hiring a lawyer entails purchasing rote
knowledge of the law. Most practicing lawyers know that the process
of learning the operative facts, discerning the law, and applying one
to the other, rather than simple knowledge of the law, is the
foundational legal skill.
Black letter rules trigger a particular heuristic in lawyers: we are
trained to carefully read and analyze rules to find (as precisely as
possible) the boundary between legal and illegal behavior.57
Boundary seeking is a basic element of the legal mind, and is perhaps
the most marketable lawyer skill. Every lawyer-transactional, tax,
or litigator-is often hired to find the boundaries of the pertinent law
and apply it to the facts and circumstances of a client's needs. Many
lawyers leave broader questions of morals or ethics aside: the lawyer
explains what actions are allowed, illegal, and in between, the gray
areas, and then the client chooses.158 Some clients have limited
154. See RULES LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 100, at 353 app. D.
155. For two excellent applications of the psychological concept of heuristics to the
legal mind, see ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW
(2000); Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same
Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51
EMORY L.J. 83 (2002). For a thoughtful consideration of what it means to "think like a
lawyer," see Alexander Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of Practical Judgment,
47 VILL. L. REV. 161 (2002). While this Article uses heuristics in the broadest sense, most
of the research and applications have been in human shortcuts for assessing risks. See, e.g.,
Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 751-53 (2003) (reviewing
THOMAS GILOVICH, ET AL., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT (2002)).
156. Barton, supra note 25, at 1196-98.
157. This observation concerning the practice of law was perhaps established most
forcefully more than a century ago by the description of Oliver Wendell Holmes' "bad
man" in his seminal work, The Path of the Law. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of
the Law, in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED PAPERS 167 (Harold J. Laski, ed.,
1920). See generally David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial
Essay on Hohnes's The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (1997) (discussing
Holmes's separation of morality and the law in The Path of the Law).
158. There is an ongoing debate over whether lawyers should play a greater
ethical/moral role in counseling and representing clients. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note
30, at 53-108 (discussing lawyer's role in sharing "practical wisdom" with clients); RHODE,
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interest in paying a lawyer to consider the ethical implications of a
given activity. Thus, many lawyers have habitually eliminated
considering broader issues once the technical process of defining legal
boundaries is completed.15 9
When lawyers apply this boundary seeking process to issues of
legal ethics the technical legal question (what am I allowed to do?)
frequently eclipses the broader moral question (what should I do?).
Under the black letter Rules, lawyers confronted with a complex
ethical problem are not encouraged to ruminate upon the possible
moral, social, and legal implications of any action. Instead, they are
encouraged to mechanically apply the requisite Model Rule, and,
unless the Rules specifically bar a contemplated action, it is presumed
acceptable.
The boundary seeking heuristic does not end with a
consideration of what the law allows and prohibits. Proficient lawyers
also calculate the likelihood of being caught and the likely
punishment if caught. It is this last step to the boundary seeking
heuristic that cripples the efficacy of the Rules. Most lawyers can
quickly deduce the slim odds that any violation of the rules will be
discovered,16 ° reported,' investigated,162 or punished .16  Thus, the
INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 17 (calling for lawyers "to accept personal moral
responsibility for the consequences of their professional acts").
159. This narrow approach to client counseling has drawn significant negative scholarly
attention. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 30, at 122-34 (arguing against narrow
conception of lawyer as counselor); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., et al., Symposium, Client
Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. L. REv. 591 (2003) (criticizing the client
centered approach as a self-serving, cost-benefit analysis). For a historical version of this
debate, consider the words of Elihu Root: "About half the practice of a decent lawyer
consists in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop." 1 PHILIP
C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938).
160. The bulk of the Rules govern the lawyer-client relationship, so it will most likely
be up to the client (who most likely does not know the Rules or understand their
requirements) to discover the violation.
161. Lawyers almost never report violations of other lawyers. Judges are similarly
mum. See ABEL, supra note 26, at 144 ("Lawyers ... are reluctant to turn in their
colleagues."); RHODE, INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 159 ("Those with the most knowledge
concerning many violations-lawyers and judges-rarely report misconduct."). The great
bulk of complaints thus generate from clients. See Julie Rose O'Sullivan, Professional
Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to Professor Schneyer's Proposal, 16 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 10 & n.39 (2002).
162. A substantial portion of all complaints are dismissed without an investigation
because they address lawyer competence, and thus do not trigger an applicable rule of
Professional Conduct. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 152, at vii (noting that ("In some
jurisdictions over ninety per cent of all complaints filed were dismissed. Most of these
complaints were dismissed for failing to allege unethical conduct"); Martin A. Cole, When
Malpractice is an Ethics Issue, 59 BENCH & B. MINN. 10, 10 (2002) (noting that "the
Director's Office has for many years routinely dismissed without investigation complaints
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true minimum standard of allowable conduct is far below the
"minimums" in the Rules. The structure of the Rules in conjunction
with the loss of moral suasion means that the Rules fail even as a
baseline minimum. The full irony of the last forty years of legal ethics
is that lawyer regulators have bifurcated the broadly ethical from the
minimalist in a continuing effort to make the minimalist controls
more effective, palatable, and enforceable. Nevertheless, eliminating
the broadly ethical and continually sharpening the minimums has
actually undermined even the minimalist project.
III. THE CLASH OF THE DUAL GOALS IN A SPECIFIC REGULATORY
ACT, THE MPRE
Thus far I have argued that the last twenty years' worth of
regulatory efforts by bar associations, state supreme courts, and legal
academics have been doomed to failure because of a fundamental
clash in goals. This Part applies this theory to a particular, recent
regulatory act, the adoption of the Multistate Professional
Responsibility Exam ("MPRE") as a prerequisite to bar admission."
I choose to discuss the MPRE, rather than one of the other regulatory
programs that straddles both the minimum Rules and
professionalism, like civility codes or mandatory ethics CLE classes,'65
because the MPRE is a uniquely important regulatory step and is
in which a client is unhappy about the quality of the lawyer's representation-or, as is
more often the case, the results achieved-but does not specify any conduct that would
violate a Rule of Professional Conduct").
163. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
164. The MPRE is a 125-minute, fifty-question, multiple-choice exam that covers the
ABA Rules of Professional Conduct ("Rules"), the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, and "controlling constitutional decisions and generally accepted principles
established in leading federal and state cases and in procedural and evidentiary rules." See
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, THE MPRE 2003 INFORMATION
BOOKLET 30 (2003) [hereinafter BOOKLET]. Note that these subjects represent a recent
expansion of coverage beyond just the Rules. See Paul T. Hayden, Putting Ethics to the
(National Standardized) Test: Tracing the Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
1299, 1303-,04 (2003).
165. These regulatory efforts are also so much less effective than the MPRE. The
quality control, range of available subjects, and potential locations make CLE classes a
notoriously ineffective regulatory step. Compare the list of vacation destination/CLE
classes offered by the Lawyer Pilot Bar Association, see LPBA CLE Credits, at
http://www.lpba.org/cle.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2004) (listing Sun Valley, Idaho,
Branson, Missouri, and Tuscon, Arizona amongst the destinations) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review), with the State Bar Association of North Dakota's "Winter CLE
and sun" in Belize, see State Bar Association of North Dakota, Belize or Bust, at
http://www.sband.org/sband-blast/blast_102303.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2004) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review), to get a flavor for just how serious the mandatory
CLE requirement is.
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among the professionalism campaign's most notable successes. 16
The MPRE is almost nationally required. Law students in forty-
seven states must now pass the MPRE prior to bar admission. 167 The
timing of the exam makes it likely that the MPRE will be a law
student's first bar admission experience; every state but Florida
allows law students (as opposed to law graduates) to sit for the
exam. 6 s  As a relatively new,169  freestanding bar admission
requirement, the MPRE represents a particularly high-profile step in
the ongoing lawyer professionalism movement. Between the MPRE
and the ABA's accreditation requirement that law schools teach a
mandatory professional responsibility class,170 law students receive at
least some message that the bar is serious about law students learning
the Rules of Professional Conduct. Lastly, the MPRE exemplifies the
efforts of bar examiners, lawyer regulators, and bar associations to
define and enforce very specific and mandatory minimum rules of
166. See Hayden, supra note 164, at 1300-02 (describing the MPRE's prevalence and
rapid adoption as an "immediate success"). I am also uniquely familiar with the test
because on March 8, 2003 I took the MPRE together with more than 20,000 other bar
applicants across the country. I draw this approximation from the National Conference of
Bar Examiners' data on the March MPRE examinations for 1996, 1997, and 1998 (the
latest dates available). See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, 1996
MULTISTATE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION STATISTICS (2001) (20,278
applicants to the March 1996 MPRE); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS,
1997 MULTISTATE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION STATISTICS (2001)
(20,117 applicants to the March 1997 MPRE); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR
EXAMINERS, 1998 MULTISTATE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION
STATISTICS (2001) (20,940 applicants to the March 1998 MPRE). I was required to take
the MPRE, as well as the Tennessee Bar examination because I was unable to waive in to
practice in this jurisdiction. Despite the memory of studying for both exams, while
teaching law students in the same jurisdiction, and practicing law under a temporary
waiver, I have made every effort to remain as impartial as possible in considering the
strengths and weaknesses of the MPRE. For a description of the evil ("advocacy
scholarship") I am attempting to avoid, see Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule,
Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 155-56 (2002)
("The vice is that much legal scholarship is advocacy scholarship, and therefore rhetorical
in the condemnatory sense: it is tendentious, sloppily or even deceptively reasoned, and
rests upon unsubstantiated factual claims or the sort of empirical shibboleths that circulate
in law schools (for example, that disagreement among the justices harms the Supreme
Court's public standing).").
167. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND
ADMISSION TO THE BAR & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, BAR
ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 21 (2004) (showing that the only states that do not require
the MPRE are Maryland, Washington, and Wisconsin).
168. Hayden, supra note 164, at 1302 & n.18.
169. The first MPRE was first offered on March 14, 1980. See Letter from the
Chairman, 49 BAR EXAMINER 1, 4 (1980).
170. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW
SCHOOLS Standard 302(b) 24 (1999).
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lawyer behavior. Given that actual enforcement of these minimum
standards among licensed attorneys is minimal, the MPRE may
actually be the single most important practical application of the
black letter Rules.
While I have generally been skeptical about the professionalism
efforts of the bench and bar,171 there is no question that on symbolism
alone the MPRE is an important step in the right direction-students
are told "this is important and this is required." Just having the exam,
however, is not enough, and the MPRE falls prey to the clash
between the twin goals of modern legal ethics. On the one hand the
MPRE seeks to produce more ethical attorneys, in the broad sense of
the word.'72 On the other hand, at a minimum the MPRE seeks to
block applicants who are ignorant of the Rules or other governing
norms.
173
After taking the exam and researching this topic, I am convinced
that the MPRE belittles serious ethical consideration and likely
encourages lawyer cynicism about legal ethics. The idea of a
multiple-choice ethics exam well captures the MPRE's fundamental
and structural shortcomings.174 The MPRE fails to encourage more
ethical behavior or to test minimal standards effectively for two main
reasons: the first is the strictures of designing a multiple-choice ethics
exam, and the second is the MPRE's effect upon the teaching of legal
ethics.
171. My previous work in the field of legal ethics places me squarely within the camps
of the skeptics and cynics, and I have previously argued that the great bulk of lawyer
regulation is meant to benefit lawyers rather than the public, Barton, supra note 26, and
that state supreme courts and bar associations should not be in charge of regulating
lawyers. See Barton, supra note 25.
172. The MPRE's purpose is "to insure [sic] that [applicants] study and be prepared to
cope with the ethical problems of the legal profession." Letter From the Chairman, 48
BAR EXAMINER 127, 128 (1979).
173. See id.; SUSAN K. BOYD, THE ABA'S FIRST SECTION: ASSURING A QUALIFIED
BAR 98 (1993) (calling MPRE an "awareness test").
174. Although the MPRE has been the subject of some scholarly opprobrium, see, e.g.,
Mary C. Daly, et al., Contextualizing Professional Responsibility: A New Curriculum for a
New Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 195-96 (1995) (arguing that MPRE has a
deleterious effect on teaching legal ethics); Leslie C. Levin, The MPRE Reconsidered, 86
KY. L.J. 395, 405-07 (1998) (arguing that the MPRE tests fictitious "national" law of
ethics, and over-emphasizes the Rules at the expense of other sources of law); William H.
Simon, "Thinking Like a Lawyer" About Ethical Questions, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 11
(1998) (asserting that MPRE "takes 'thinking like a lawyer' to mean not thinking at all"),
there has been no systematic attempt to discredit the use of a multiple-choice format to
test legal ethics. There has, however, been an excellent overview of the history of the test
and its place within the legalization of professional responsibility. See Hayden, supra note
164, at 1299-1302.
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A. Multiple-Choice Test Design
The process of drafting a multiple-choice ethics exam amplifies
many of the problems with the Rules. It rewards a "technocratic"
approach to legal ethics because the MPRE only tests settled areas of
the law with simple fact patterns and counter-intuitive Rules that
must simply be memorized.
1. Settled Areas and Simple Fact Patterns
A multiple-choice exam can only test settled areas of the law
because there must always be a single correct answer.175 This is a
substantial loss because, despite the ABA's effort to reduce and
clarify the rules, there are still a number of unsettled and gray areas
176
that would provide natural questions for a bar exam. Furthermore,
choosing the clearest areas of the black letter law further emphasizes
technocratic and legalistic thinking. Any student who finds herself
ruminating on a question or thinking that there are several different
applicable moral standards (or Model Rules) can be certain of only
one thing: she is on the wrong track for the MPRE. Strategic
students taking the exam will avoid thinking carefully about the facts
presented and their ethical or moral ramifications. Instead, the
strategic student recognizes the constraints of a multiple-choice exam
and mechanically applies the letter of the law.
A multiple-choice exam also cannot easily test on complex
situations where various overlapping legal (let alone moral or ethical)
obligations are implicated. The MPRE, in comparison to the
Multistate Bar Examination ("MBE"), generally uses simple fact
scenarios attached to a single question.177 This is because the test
designers must write questions with clear answers, and a complex fact
175. See LAZAR EMANUEL, STRATEGIES & TACTICS FOR THE MPRE 7 (2001) ("[I]n
order for a multiple choice exam to be valid, the answers have to be unquestionably
correct."); Daly, et al., supra note 174, at 196 (noting that the MPRE's "multiple-choice
format" requires questions "capable of clear, correct resolution"); Eugene L. Smith, Can
You Test Ethics?, 50 BAR EXAMINER 25, 29 (1981) (describing process of drafting the
MPRE and noting that they "to the extent that it is possible, avoid cloudy areas of law").
176. See, e.g., Garret Glass & Kathleen Jackson, Current Development, The
Unauthorized Practice of Law: The Internet, Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Multidisciplinary Practice, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1195, 1195-96, 1199-2001 (2001)
(discussing multiple unsettled areas under the Model Rules); Lee A. Pizzimenti, A Post
Conference Reflection: In Defense of Fuzzy Rules and Simple Truths, 37 S. TEX. L. REV.
1263,1263-65 (1996) (defending the Rules against an attack of "fuzziness").
177. Compare BOOKLET, supra note 164, at 37-57 (offering twenty-five practice
questions, none of which rely on the same fact pattern) with NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
BAR EXAMINERS, SAMPLE MBE, FEBRUARY 1991 (1991) (including multiple questions
that rely on a common fact pattern).
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scenario would muddy the waters. Nevertheless, as any practicing
attorney will attest, professional and ethical dilemmas are rarely
simple or one-dimensional. The simplicity of the MPRE's fact
scenarios again encourages a technocratic approach; the applicants
are encouraged to see each Rule and fact scenario as separate and
self-contained, instead of recognizing the kaleidoscopic nature of
lawyering.
2. Making the MPRE Hard
The exam designers are thus limited to settled areas of the law
and relatively straightforward factual scenarios. Nevertheless, the
exam writers have several tools at their disposal to keep the MPRE
from being too easy or too commonsense. 178  The exam poses
questions that are either based on esoteric rules one would only know
if one memorized them or that have answers contrary to common
sense. An advertisement for an MPRE study book warns students
that the test makers "set traps that can catch you even if you think
you know the rules, by using tricks that make the wrong answers
seem right. 179
The MPRE regularly tests in areas of professional responsibility
where the minimum standards are not common sense; these areas
require simple memorization of the applicable standards. For
example, on my MPRE there was a question about whether a judge
could appear as a character witness at a family friend's trial. As
Barbri's Conviser Mini Review for the MPRE states, the judicial
"character witness issue is an exam favorite."' 8 ° The basic rule is that
a judge may appear as a character witness in a trial only when
subpoenaed.'81  The MPRE generally tests the rule by stating
sympathetic facts of a close friend or family member in a questionable
prosecution, and then states several different rules in the answers:
the judge may never appear as a character witness, the judge may
178. Note that the MPRE was meant to correct problems with legal ethics essays that
did not require "applicants to discriminate in their answers." See Joe Covington,
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, 50 BAR EXAMINER 21, 21 (1981).
Furthermore, the exam-writers are likely aware of the scuttlebutt that the MPRE is an
easy exam. See David A. Logan, Upping the Ante: Curricular and Bar Exam Reform in
Professional Responsibility, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1023, 1029-30 (1999).
179. The Law Bookstore, Strategies & Tactics Series: Strategies and Tactics for the
MPRE, at http://www.lawbooks.com/30090.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2004) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
180. BARBRI BAR REVIEW, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY XLIV (2003).
181. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(B) (1990) ("A Judge shall
not testify voluntarily as a character witness.")
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appear if subpoenaed, the judge may appear if the other judge
approves the appearance, or the judge simply may appear if she
chooses to. 82 This is a classic example of a non-intuitive rule. Exam-
takers have either memorized the rule or they have not. Other
examples of this phenomenon include test questions on when judges
can sit on boards 83 and on what lawyers must tell legislators when
testifying before a legislature."8
These sorts of questions further reinforce the technocratic lawyer
model. Students are taught that the key to legal ethics is to memorize
the tricky rules and simply to apply them. Too often the MPRE
reduces legal ethics to the least common-sense rules, rather than a
broader notion of shared lawyer values. These questions also
invariably lead to student cynicism. After studying for and taking the
MPRE I came to compare these questions to those on the various
written driving tests I have taken.8 5 I have found that multiple choice
driving tests frequently consist of highly technical questions that can
only be known by memorizing the pamphlet of rules you receive
before the test (questions about how many feet to park away from a
hydrant, or how many yards to follow behind another car when you
are both going thirty-five m.p.h.). These questions do little to test
whether you are a good driver; they test your memorization skills or
your skills at gaming the test. Similarly, the MPRE memorization
questions do little to test whether you will be an ethical lawyer or
even whether you have a good overall grasp on professional
responsibility. Instead, they diminish and devalue the entire
endeavor.
182. See BARBRI, supra note 180, at XLIV ("Often the examiners will give you the
opposite rule as a possible choice.").
183. Consider the following "exam tip" from Barbri: "Be wary of questions where a
judge is appointed to the board of a school. A judge may not accept appointment to the
board of a public school other than a law school. A judge may, however, accept
appointment to the board of any private school. Thus, you must remember that a judge
can sit on the board of a public law school and any private school." Id. at XLVIII.
184. Under Model Rule 3.9 a lawyer may appear in a representative capacity before a
legislative body, if the lawyer informs the body she is there "in a representative capacity."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.9 (2004). The questions in this area sometimes
require the applicant to know the magic language "representative capacity," see
BOOKLET, supra note 164, at 44, or sometimes depend on whether the lawyer is required
to name her actual client, or just disclose that she is testifying for an unnamed client (the
latter is all that is required). See BARBRI, supra note 180, at 178, 203; MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT' R. 6.4 (2004).
185. Over the last seventeen years I have taken a written driving test in New York,
Massachusetts, California, Michigan, and New Jersey. I pride myself on the skill of
skimming the "Rules of the Road for State X" brochure for ten minutes and then passing
the exam with flying colors.
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The MPRE exam writers also tend to draft questions that require
answers that cut against the applicant's common-sense ethical
instincts.1 16 For example, the exam-writers love to ask about the
propriety of legal fees (which is humorous in and of itself given the
elasticity of Model Rule 1.5 and the rarity of any disciplinary actions
under that Rule). 7 One question on my MPRE asked about a
grateful client who pays the lawyer her fees, and then gives the lawyer
an extremely valuable gift as a thank you. The question was worded
to make the reader uncomfortable with the gift, and to imply that
Rule 1.5 might be violated. The correct answer is that since it was a
gift, and not a fee, it does not matter how much it was worth. The
exam writers purposely undermine common-sense intuition by using a
student's discomfort over receiving an inappropriate gift to lead to an
incorrect answer. The MPRE thus teaches students to resist their
initial, common-sense reaction to an ethical problem-an approach
that does little to encourage more ethical behavior among future
lawyers.
The MPRE also encourages students to "game" the exam. For
example, the Emmanuel's study guide to the MPRE actually covers
little substantive law. Instead, it is filled with "strategies and tactics"
for taking the MPRE, including a section on bar examiner "traps"'18
and a section on finding the "EZ-pass to the right answer.' 18 9
Although all bar examination methods will likely be subject to such a
deconstruction, the MPRE's multiple-choice format is particularly
vulnerable to, and specifically invites, game-playing.
The MPRE's focus on non-common sense Rules and its efforts to
pit common-sense moral judgment against the requirements of the
Rules further exacerbates the problem of malum prohibitum Rules.
The MPRE actually reinforces the division between the moral and
the Rules, and decreases the likelihood of future compliance based
upon a common sense reaction for or against any particular course of
conduct.
186. This may explain Professor Deborah Rhode's MPRE advice: "when in doubt,
pick the second most ethical course of conduct." Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the
Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEG. EDUC. 31, 41 (1992). Humorously, Professor Rhode is
actually an optimist on the ethical standards of the MPRE. See Delgado, supra note 43, at
953 (noting that "[s]tudents preparing to take the MPRE ... often conclude that the
correct answer is almost always the third least ethical one").
187. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2004) (listing the eight factors to
consider in deciding the "reasonableness" of a lawyer's fee).
188. EMANUEL, supra note 175, at 28-41. This section includes specific advice about
what answer to choose when the answer's modifier is "because," "if," or "unless." See id.
189. See id. at 41-44.
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B. "Facial Validity" and Legal Ethics
Educators and psychologists have extensively studied the
subjects of assessment and test design. A critical aspect of test design
is test validity. 9 ° "Validity" is a term of art in this context, and is
subject to varying definitions,' 9' but generally validity involves both
content and purpose: a test should actually test what it claims to be
testing and then the collected data must be properly used.'92 In
evaluating the validity of a test's content, it is critical to canvas the
goals of the test and its subject area coverage. "Face validity" is the
most basic kind of comparison between the test's form and content; it
"tells us the degree to which a test looks like it measures what it
purports to measure. '' 19  The test should seem appropriate and
relevant: "[m]echanical engineers expect tests to assess mechanical
engineering problems and catering students expect problems which
are set in catering situations."'94
Technically speaking, the MPRE is valid. The "MPRE is not a
test designed to determine an individual's personal ethical values;"
instead, it is an "awareness test," meant to guarantee fluency with the
minimum standards of the profession. 95  The MPRE's "facial
validity" disconnect, however, is in the gap between legal ethics and
the minimum standards of professional responsibility. No matter how
many times bar examiners and the ABA avoid the word "ethics" and
substitute the words "professional responsibility," bar applicants and
professors still think of the area as "legal ethics."'196 If one considers
190. See THOMAS M. HALADYNA, DEVELOPING AND VALIDATING MULTIPLE-
CHOICE TEST ITEMS 27 (1994) ("The most important consideration in testing is validity.");
STEVEN J. OSTERLIND, CONSTRUCTING TEST ITEMS: MULTIPLE CHOICE,
CONSTRUCTED RESPONSE, PERFORMANCE, AND OTHER FORMATS 61 (2d ed., 1998)
("The concept of validity is the paramount concern in test item construction .... ).
191. See OSTERLIND, supra note 190, at 61-62 (quoting various scholarly definitions of
validity).
192. See Samuel Messick, Validity, in EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT 13, 13 (Robert
L. Linn, ed., 3d ed., 1989) ("[V]alidation is essentially a matter of making the most
reasonable case to guide both current use of the test and current research to advance
understanding of what the test scores mean,"); see also JULIE COTTON, THE THEORY OF
ASSESSMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 93 (1995) (stating that "a method of assessment is said
to be valid if it measures the intended aims, goals, objectives, performance, or quality").
193. David Medoff, The Scientific Basis of Psychological Testing: Considerations
Following Daubert, Kumho, and Joiner, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 199,203 (2003).
194. See COTTON, supra note 192, at 93.
195. See BOYD, supra note 173, at 98.
196. Consider for example the titles of casebooks, MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE
SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYER'S ETHICS (2002); RICHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL A.
LONGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (2002); the title of The
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics; or law school "legal ethics" centers at Mercer Law
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the MPRE an effort to test legal ethics in any broader sense, the test
does not meet the criteria of facial validity because the test actively
ignores and denigrates ethical and moral considerations.
C. General Weaknesses of Multiple-Choice Exams
Aside from the specific problems with drafting a multiple-choice
ethics exam, there are the general problems associated with
standardized tests. The flip side to the applicants who successfully
game the MPRE is that applicants who do not test well are
disadvantaged. There has long been anecdotal evidence that some
people simply do not react well to standardized, multiple-choice
tests.197 Studies have shown that the selection of a testing format
(typically between multiple-choice and free-response) has a powerful
effect on testing results. 198 Standardized, multiple-choice exams test
more than their subject matter; they also measure the test taker's
abilities within the particular exam format.
Furthermore, recent studies suggest that standardized, multiple-
choice tests may be inherently biased.199 It is problematic, therefore
School or Texas Law School.
197. See, e.g., ANDREW J. STRENIO, JR., THE TESTING TRAP 17-19 (1981) (telling story
of bar applicant who excelled at every level of school but tested awfully on the SAT,
LSAT, and MBE, and failed the bar examination multiple times despite graduating in the
top ten per cent of his law school class). There has also been increasing awareness of the
serious effects of test anxiety, especially for those taking standardized tests. See MOSHE
ZEIDNER, TEST ANXIETY, THE STATE OF THE ART 218 (1998) (discussing anxiety and
effects on SAT scores).
198. See James L. Outtz, Testing Medium, Validity, and Test Performance, in BEYOND
MULTIPLE CHOICE 48-54 (Milton D. Hakel ed., 1998) (gathering various studies showing
that test format has a strong influence on test results); Greg Sergienko, New Modes of
Assessment, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 463, 502-05 (2001) (comparing various modes of
student assessment in law schools); Ian Weinstein, Testing Multiple Intelligences:
Comparing Evaluation by Simulation and Written Exam, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 247, 252-59
(2001) (describing various "personal intelligences" and their reaction to differing
assessment techniques).
199. The bulk of the research has focused on the SAT, and the results are powerful and
disturbing. SAT scores correlate strongly by gender (males score higher than females),
see DAVID OWEN, NONE OF THE ABOVE: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE SATs 223-27 (1999)
(listing multiple studies showing an SAT gender bias towards males); Marlaine E.
Lockheed, Sex Bias in Aptitude and Achievement Tests Used in Higher Education, in THE
UNDERGRADUATE WOMAN: ISSUES IN EDUCATIONAL EQUITY (Pamela Perun ed.,
1982); by race (white score higher than non-whites), see JAMES CROUSE & DALE
TRUSHEIM, THE CASE AGAINST THE SAT 89-121 (1988) (noting gap in SAT scores
between blacks and whites); ALLAN NAIRN, THE REIGN OF ETS: THE CORPORATION
THAT MAKES UP MINDS 110 (1980) (observing the "systematic distribution of low scores"
for minorities on ETS exams); William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates
"Built-In Headwinds": An Educational and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 131, 141-45 (2002) (noting gap in SAT scores between whites and
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that the test which purports to advance a greater "professionalism"
among lawyers is infirmed by inherent inequities." ° Given the great
disparities in bar passage rates by race, there is also evidence to
suggest that bar examinations may suffer from similar biases.2"'
Although there are no specific studies as to the bias with regard
to the MPRE, and it is therefore impossible to impute concretely the
empirical research with regard to other standardized tests concretely
onto the MPRE, there is nonetheless sufficient correlation to reason
minorities), and by family income (higher incomes correlate with higher scores); see
STRENIO, supra note 197, at 36-38 (presenting evidence of correlation between SAT
scores and income); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action:
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 988-89 (1996) (citing various studies
and showing the strong correlation between income level and test performance); Stanley
Fish, Reverse Racism or How the Pot Got to Call the Kettle Black, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Nov. 1993, at 128, 132 ("[W]hat is being measured by the SAT is not absolutes like native
ability and merit but accidents like birth, social position, access to libraries, and the
opportunity to take vacations or to take SAT prep courses.").
200. There is also evidence of similar biases in the LSAT. There is evidence of a high
correlation between SAT and LSAT scores. See NAIRN, supra note 199, at 234 (discussing
ETS study showing a high correlation between SAT and LSAT scores). There is also
evidence of racial bias. See Eulius Simien, The Law School Admission Test as a Barrier to
Almost Twenty Years of Affirmative Action, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 359, 378 (1986);
William C. Kidder, Comment, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic
Differences in Educational Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving "Elite" College
Students, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1055 (1991) (concluding that the LSAT systematically
disadvantages minority law school applicants). There is also evidence of gender bias, see
William Kidder, Portia Denied: Unmasking Gender Bias on the LSA T and Its Relationship
to Racial Diversity in Legal Education, 12 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 6 (2000) (discussing
gender bias); and class bias, see Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self-
Interest? 10 Reasons Why UC-Davis Should Abandon the LSAT (And Why Other Good
Law Schools Should Follow Suit), 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 593, 601-06 (2001) (noting
correlations between wealth and race in LSAT and other standardized tests).
This evidence of bias is even more indefensible because the SAT and the LSAT
are actually relatively poor predictors of future academic success. See OWEN, supra note
199, at 196-203 (establishing the lack of a significant correlation between SAT scores and
college grades); WARREN W. WILLINGHAM ET AL., PREDICTING COLLEGE GRADES: AN
ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL TRENDS OVER TWO DECADES (1990) (same); see also
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS
281 (1998) (showing the success of African American students admitted to universities
under affirmative action programs with SAT below the institution's median score); Lani
Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League Law
School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23 n.70, 27 n.74 (1994) (describing the weak relationship
between LSAT and first-, second-, and third-year grades).
201. See Kristin Booth Glen, When and Where We Enter: Rethinking Admission to the
Legal Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1696, 1711-15 (2002) (discussing substantial
differences in bar passage rates for blacks and whites); LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LSAC
NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL BAR PASSAGE STUDY 32 (1998) (showing that the "eventual"
bar passage rate for blacks, American Indians, and Hispanics were all lower than for
whites, and that the rate was 77.63% for blacks and 96.68% for whites).
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that it too may suffer similar problems.202 It stands to reason that the
MPRE may well suffer from some of the unconscious class and race
bias that has been detected in other standardized test questions.203 As
with other exams, the expense of review materials and courses gives
an advantage to those who can afford them. The MPRE almost
certainly further rewards those who naturally "test well," and
punishes those who do not.2°4 In sum, recent research has raised a
number of troubling questions about the fairness and efficacy of
large-scale, standardized, multiple-choice exams, and this research is
germane to analyzing the MPRE.
Lastly, for all of the comforting certainty of a multiple-choice
exam, sometimes the "correct" answers are simply wrong.20 Consider
the February 2003 Multistate Bar Exam ("MBE"). After ACT
202. There are no similar studies of the MPRE, and without such studies it is
impossible to state concretely whether the poor record of the SAT and LSAT can be
imputed to the MPRE. Nevertheless, some of the root causes of the biases on the SAT
and LSAT are certainly present with the MPRE. The MPRE "is assembled and
administered by ACT on behalf of the National Conference of Bar Examiners." See
BOOKLET, supra note 164, at 3. The NCBE uses ACT to gather information about test
question design, test validity, and test operations. See Francis D. Morrissey, Report of the
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination Committee, 50 BAR EXAMINER 18-19
(1981). ACT is best known for administering the ACT assessment college entrance exam.
Although the ACT assessment has not been as widely studied as the SAT, the few
available studies have shown a disparate impact by race. See Theodore Cross & Robert
Slater, Special Report: Affirmative Action and Black Access to Higher Education, 17 J.
BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 8 (1997) (displaying results of a study of SAT, ACT, LSAT, and
MCAT scores, and concluding that if standardized tests governed admissions decisions at
America's leading universities black enrollment would drop by at least one-half and at
many schools by as much as eighty percent), and gender. See REBECCA ZWICK, FAIR
GAME? THE USE OF STANDARDIZED ADMISSIONS TESTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 144
(2002) (showing gender disparity on multiple ACT sections), and a similar lack of success
in predicting student outcomes at university. See SACKS, supra note 88, at 268, 272 (citing
two studies showing poor predictive value for the ACT); ZWICK, supra, at 147 (noting
studies establishing that the ACT underpredicts women's university grades). Given the
relatively spotty track record of the large-scale testing industry, the involvement of ACT
alone inspires suspicion.
203. See Delgado, supra note 200, at 605 (arguing that many standardized "test
questions presuppose knowledge that is only common in middle or upper class white
communities"); Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSA T. Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER
& L. 121,121-37 (1993) (examining actual LSAT questions to demonstrate bias); William
C. Kidder, The Rise of the Testocracy: An Essay on the LSA T, Conventional Wisdom, and
the Dismantling of Diversity, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 167, 38-42 app. (2000) (noting results
of studies showing upper class bias in standardized tests).
204. For example, Professor Henderson has recently argued that the LSAT may have
an adverse impact on minority students because of its emphasis on test-taking speed. See
generally William D. Henderson, The LSA T, Law School Exams, and Meritocracy: The
Surprising and Undertheorized Role of Test-Taking Speed, 82 TEX. L. REV. 975 (2004)
(examining the impact of test-taking speed on LSAT scores).
205. See Delgado, supra note 200, at 598 & nn.28-30.
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discovered a "clerical error" in the grading of the February 2003
MBE some bar applicants who had already been told that they had
passed were told that their scores would be "recalculated," and they
might have failed.0 6
D. Teaching to the Test
The MPRE requirement closely followed an earlier effort to
increase the professionalism of new lawyers: the ABA changed its
law school accreditation standards and required that all students take
a mandatory class in professional responsibility. 207 At some schools
this has meant little more than a grudging effort to teach the Rules
themselves.0 8 Nevertheless, there has been a growing scholarly
attention to the teaching of legal ethics,2 9 and multiple commentators
have joined the call for a more thoughtful, contextual approach to
legal ethics, with a concomitant move away from law school classes
that simply drill the students on the Model Rules.210
The MPRE, by contrast, tends to turn any law school class on
legal ethics into an MPRE review course. The existence of the
MPRE places tremendous pressure on legal ethics teachers to teach
to the exam.21' Professors who attempt a more thoughtful approach
206. See Jon Craig, Bar Exam Error Puts Test Takers on Edge, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
May 9, 2003, at 3F (reporting that the error could effect the bar passage of approximately
4300 applicants); see also NAIRN, supra note 199, at 139-40 (describing that thirty to forty
exam answers were wrong on one multistate bar examination).
207. See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics & Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. &
BUS. FIN. 9, 34 & n.128 (2002).
208. See RHODE, PERVASIVE METHOD, supra note 17, at 200 (describing this
phenomenon as "legal ethics without the ethics"); see also Schlitz, supra note 8, at 908
("Most likely, you will devote the majority of the time in your professional responsibility
class to studying the rules, and you will, of course, learn the rules cold so that you can pass
the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam.").
209. For example, Professor Deborah Rhode has been at the forefront of teaching
ethics by the pervasive method, i.e., recognizing that ethical questions cut across the law
school curriculum, and affect every aspect of teaching and practice. See RHODE,
PERVASIVE METHOD, supra note 17, at xxix (arguing that "[pirofessional responsibility
questions should be addressed in all substantive courses because they arise in all
substantive fields, and because their resolution implicates values that are central to
lawyers' personal and professional lives").
210. See Luban & Millemann, supra note 108, at 3; Pearce, supra note 17, at 735-36;
Thomas L. Schaffer, Using the Pervasive Method of Teaching Legal Ethics in a Property
Course, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 655, 655-56 (2002) (noting a modern trend to combine the
teaching of ethics with traditional courses); Symposium, Recommitting to Teaching Legal
Ethics-Shaping Our Teaching in a Changing World, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 101 (2002); W.
Bradley Wendel, Teaching Ethics in an Atmosphere of Skepticism and Relativism, 36
U.S.F. L. REV. 711, 713-14 (2002) (encouraging the use of "ordinary discursive practices"
to teach ethics).
211. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, A Case Study, 69
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to legal ethics butt up against students who focus on the MPRE.
Moreover, many law students are much more comfortable learning
(and many professors are more comfortable teaching) professional
responsibility as a series of rules. 212 As one student told me, "teach it
to me like the UCC."
Of course, the students who complain that a contextual approach
to legal ethics does nothing to prepare them for the MPRE have a fair
point because the MPRE actively punishes such an approach.
Students who stop to consider the moral and ethical ramifications of
their actions are most likely caught by the structure of the MPRE's
questions. Thus, the MPRE itself undermines law school classes in
professionalism-probably the Bar's other most notable
professionalism effort-by drawing focus away from broader ethical
considerations and back towards the minimum rules.
E. Why Not an Essay?
The MPRE does serve some salutary purposes. The MPRE
probably weeds out bar applicants who know little about professional
responsibility, and it does force students to learn at least the
minimum behavioral standards of the profession. The MPRE now
also includes law from the ALI's Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers,213 which is a helpful recognition of the fuller scope of lawyer
regulation.
Nevertheless, as currently structured, the MPRE amplifies much
of the worst elements of the clash between the minimalist and broadly
ethical projects.214 Students preparing to take the MPRE memorize
non-commonsense Rules, learn to be wary of their natural instincts,
FORDHAM L. REV. 817, 819 (2000) (reporting that most students expect their legal ethics
course to prepare them for the MPRE); Roger C. Cramton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule,
Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 171
(1996) ("Because most law students must take this test, many of them approach their
required ethics course with tunnel vision-viewing it as preparation for the MPRE").
212. See RHODE, INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 200.
213. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000). For an
overview of the Restatement's drafting process, and its areas of coverage, see generally
Lawrence J. Latto, The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: A View From the
Trenches, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 697 (1998).
214. Earlier in this Article I noted a common cycle in lawyer regulation that proceeds
from the perceived crisis, to proposed solution, to recognition of solution's limited effect,
to additional calls of crisis. The MPRE itself has followed this cycle, as bar regulators in
New York recently greatly raised the passing score on the MPRE to bar applicants
ignorant of the Rules. See Glen, supra note 201, at 1708 n.32; Melissa Rourke & Meredith
Schoenfeld, The Honesty Standard and the Need for a More Stringent Standard. An
Update on Model Rule 8.1, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 895, 900-01 (2002).
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and mechanically apply the Rules to every situation. In the parlance
of the MPRE, if no rule bars their conduct they are not "subject to
discipline,"2 5 regardless of any broader ethical or moral ramifications.
In short, the format and structure of the MPRE strangles the life out
of the law school focus on legal ethics and inevitably fosters cynicism.
The irony, of course, is that many of the problems with the
MPRE could be solved by a state specific essay exam, rather than a
national multiple-choice test. A mandatory state essay testing
professional responsibility would eliminate many of the MPRE's most
glaring faults and provide the same benefits. An essay question
would still require students to study and know the law governing
lawyers, but applicants would be forced to apply the law in context to
more nuanced fact patterns. An essay question would also be based
in the actual Rules of the jurisdiction, instead of the fictional
"national" law tested by the MPRE.21 6
The MPRE's drafters would surely object that the exam itself
was designed to correct the perceived failings of an earlier generation
of ethics essays. One of the justifications for a separate ethics exam
was the concern that an applicant could fail the ethics essay and still
pass the bar.2" 7 This is an argument for a separate exam, however, not
a multiple-choice exam.
Another difficulty involves coverage issues. A multiple-choice
exam can always test on a much broader array of topics than an essay
exam in a comparable time period. Nevertheless, there is a difference
between breadth and depth, and arguably an essay exam would
require students to actually study harder because they would be
expected to analyze a fact situation, apply the relevant Rules, and
write a cogent analysis. The MPRE allows applicants to key off of the
answers themselves; an essay would require a deeper understanding
of the material, and a better facility with ethics as applied to complex
215. Anyone who has studied for or taken the MPRE will surely recognize these three
underlined words, as they are frequently the call of the question on the MPRE. See
BOOKLET, supra note 164, at 37-57 (using underlined phrase "subject to discipline" in nine
of twenty-five model questions).
216. The "national" character of the MPRE has been subject to criticism. See Levin,
supra note 47, at 404-05.
217. See Morrissey, supra note 202, at 18 ("Most jurisdictions integrated the results of
ethics questions with the results of the entire examination. Thus, an individual could
demonstrate absolutely no awareness of ethical principles and no ability to apply ethical
principles and yet could receive a license because of high scores in contracts, torts,
property and other substantive areas."). This criticism from a bar examiner is a little odd,
since it is true of any bar exam subject, and seemingly undermines the whole process.
Theoretically, any applicant could know nothing about several subjects and still pass the
bar (and go on the day after bar passage to practice in the know-nothing area).
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situations. Because an essay exam would involve more analysis and
application, it might actually require students to study harder, and
more thoughtfully.218 A final objection involves bias in grading. The
grading of an essay is inherently more subjective than grading a
multiple-choice exam. Nevertheless, given the extensive evidence of
bias in the drafting and design of standardized tests, 219 multiple-choice
exams are hardly a cure-all for subjectivity. In fact, many experts in
assessment have been moving away from multiple-choice tests and
towards more performance-based examinations.220 While an essay
exam would not be a true performance based exam,22I it would test a
broader and more relevant array of skills than a multiple-choice test.
In fact, given the oxymoronic nature of a multiple choice ethics
exam, the choice to reject an essay alone tells us a lot about the
current approach to lawyer regulation. The MPRE establishes that
while both the minimalist and broadly ethical goals are given lip
service, the emphasis is on rote knowledge and mechanical
application of the Rules.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS-NARROW AND LARGE
This is the third Article in a series that criticizes the goals and
programs underlying lawyer regulation, and I inevitably arrive at the
"solutions" portion of my projects with hesitancy. It is always easier
to point out the flaws in someone else's efforts than to present a
coherent alternative.222 Nevertheless, any critique that does not lend
itself to some form of redress is of little use.
This Part offers two proposed solutions, one easy and narrow
218. Cf GILBERT SAX, PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION 116-17 (1989) (listing advantages of essay exams).
219. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
220. See generally HOWARD GARDNER, MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (1993) (arguing
for an emphasis on ongoing assessment rather than formalized testing); RUTH MITCHELL,
TESTING FOR LEARNING: How NEW APPROACHES TO EVALUATION CAN IMPROVE
AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1992) (arguing that methods in addition to multiple-choice should
be used to assess performance); Outtz, supra note 198 (discussing the relationships
between test characteristics, performance, and validity). By analogy, a recent test
procedure for mediators is grounded in performance-based measurements, rather than a
more traditional exam. See, e.g., TEST DESIGN PROJECT, PERFORMANCE-BASED
ASSESSMENT: A METHODOLOGY FOR USE IN SELECTING, TRAINING, AND
EVALUATING MEDIATORS (1995) (providing a framework for programs to select, train,
and evaluate mediators).
221. For an example of a true performance based approach to bar admission, see Glen,
supra note 201, at 1722-39.
222. For a short reflection on the multifarious joys of being a critic, see Barton, supra
note 28, at 593-94 & nn.21-22.
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and the other difficult and broad. The easy solution is for lawyer
regulators to recognize that they are pursuing two goals-minimum
compliance and ethical lawyering-and to refocus explicitly their
efforts based around these two goals. The harder solution is to
reunite the twin goals into the single goal of providing ethical, moral,
and practical guidance to lawyers and adopt a new approach based
more squarely on the model of the Canons.
A. The Easier Solution-Goal Clarity
The easy solution is that lawyer regulators should be much
clearer in their thinking about what they are trying to accomplish and
how.223 They now have two distinct goals. Rather than treating these
goals as if they are identical or substantially overlapping, we should
recognize these goals explicitly and pursue them jointly in light of
their effect on each other.
As noted at the very outset of this Article, lawyer regulators have
been fuzzy on almost every aspect of their professionalism project.
There is little clarity about the crisis or problem they are trying to
solve, and little understanding of the meaning of the goal of increased
"professionalism." '224  Obviously a clear understanding of the
parameters of the problems and the goal are necessary before any
real attempts at a solution can be attempted. A first step would be
clarity on the underlying problems and a definition of the goal. A
second step would be recognition that bar regulators are pursuing two
distinct and sometimes contradictory goals.225
Thus far these solutions seem relatively uncontroversial: who is
against clarifying underlying problems and the goals for addressing
those problems? As it turns out, lawyer regulators are probably
consciously or subconsciously against it because the current fuzziness
and conflation of goals serves to hide some rather unpleasant truths
223. Other commentators have similarly pleaded "for a little more rigor in the use of
concepts like professionalism and ethics." Wendel, supra note 11, at 1028; see also Rhode,
supra note 12, at 459 ("A threshold question is whether we are all on the same page, or
even in the same book, with respect to what we are trying to fix.").
224. See, e.g., Vincent, supra note 126, at 24 ("In spite of the attention devoted to the
subject, however, professionalism has no uniformly accepted definition."); Rhode, supra
note 8, at 315 (noting that at a recent ABA Conference on Teaching and Learning
Professionalism, "[tihere was universal disagreement about what professionalism is").
225. The debates over the meaning of the word "professionalism" affect how ethical
lawyers should be, not whether the goal is to raise the bar, i.e., lawyer regulators know
they want to improve lawyer ethics, the question is whether they want a small
improvement (try to be civil) or a large improvement (try to broadly conceive of the
lawyer's role to include the interests of justice, the public, and the courts).
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about lawyer regulation. For example, any clarity here requires
recognizing the great disparity in the importance of the two goals.
One of the reasons that the bar's professionalism efforts have failed is
that they are so patently less valued and less rigorously pursued than
the minimalist project. Since the 1960s the great bulk of effort has
gone into the minimalist project, redrafting the Rules, 26 increasing
knowledge of the Rules,227 offering assistance in complying with the
Rules,228 and attempting to increase enforcement.2 9 By contrast the
professionalism efforts appear languid, non-mandatory, and
hamstrung: civility codes,230 accelerated public relations,231 and more
professionalism conferences for the bar, law professors, and judges.23 2
In short, the bar has taken the minimalist project relatively seriously,
while paying lip service to the broadly ethical goal.
Lawyer regulators have veiled their lack of effort on
professionalism by presenting two goals as one. The only way to
justify the claim that lawyer regulators care deeply about
professionalism is to argue that both the minimalist and the broadly
ethical projects are aimed at professionalism. The explicit disjunction
between the Rules and the broadly moral, as well as the minimalist
nature of the Rules themselves, however, belies this claim and leads
to the clash in goals described earlier.
Recognizing two distinct goals would also raise the
uncomfortable question of why regulatory efforts are so heavily
biased towards the minimalist project. As I have noted elsewhere,
the surest proof that the regulation of lawyers is self-interested is to
compare the efforts and treatment of a regulatory area that impinges
lawyer self-interest with one that does not.233 Given that the Rules
226. Ethics 2000 is the most recent example. See generally Symposium, Ethics 2000 and
Beyond: Reform or Professional Responsibility as Usual?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1173
(2003) (providing articles that analyze and critique Ethics 2000).
227. The MPRE, mandatory law school classes, and mandatory ethics CLE all serve
this goal.
228. The work of ethics committees, ethics hotlines, and Lawyer Assistance Programs
all fit this purpose.
229. See generally CLARK REPORT, supra note 152 (discussing problems with
disciplinary enforcement and making recommendations); MCKAY REPORT, supra note
152 (discussing similar disciplinary enforcement problems).
230. See Center for Professional Responsibility, supra note 5.
231. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 4, at 302; JUSTICES ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at
39-44.
232. See LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 24, at 33-34 (suggesting
"[s]ponsoring and participating in bench/bar conferences where the current issues of
civility, etiquette, and professionalism can be openly discussed").
233. See Barton, supra note 25, at 1208-09 (comparing the treatment of bar admissions
(a natural area of lawyer self-interest for economic and anti-competitive reasons) with bar
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may be used to discipline or disbar a lawyer, lawyer self-interest
dictates that they be as clear, narrow, and easy-to-follow as possible.
By contrast, professionalism is a much harder sell on self-interest
grounds.234 Predictably, the regulatory efforts have flowed in the
direction of the minimalist project.
In sum, a simple solution is to acknowledge the existence of two
distinct goals and to recognize that they frequently conflict.235
Because of the inherent benefits of blurring these goals, however, the
adoption of even this solution seems unlikely.
B. The Broader Solution-Redraft the Canons
This Article has argued that the clash of goals began with the
adoption of the Code and the abandonment of the Canons. Prior to
the Code, bar associations and lawyer regulators pursued a single
goal-presenting moral, ethical, and practical guidance to lawyers.
With the adoption of the Code and then the Rules the goal was
divided in two. The simplest, but most difficult solution, is to reunite
the two goals, and focus the efforts of the bar and lawyer regulators
on providing the blend of the moral and the practical offered by the
Canons and predecessor statements of legal ethics. Representatives
from among lawyer regulators, bar associations, judges, law
professors, and lawyers (i.e., the entire profession) 236 could approach
this new statement of lawyer principles as an opportunity to unite the
profession and agree on common principles of lawyering, ethics, and
morality. The profession would start from first principles, broadly
stated, and work top-down towards the specific guidance for the
discipline (a natural area of disinterest)).
234. It may well benefit all lawyers to have the profession be more ethical, but
professionalism raises a classic collective action problem. Each individual lawyer might
prefer higher ethical standards for all, but will likely resist the work involved in raising her
own standards, let alone raising the standards of the profession at large. For the seminal
work identifying and explicating collective action problems, see MANCUR OLSON, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 43-52 (1968).
235. Of course, recognizing a problem alone may not really be a "solution" in the
strictest sense; it is more of a precursor to more effective solutions. Nevertheless, since
current "solutions" are based on a misunderstanding of the underlying problems and
goals, and are actually undermining the entire project, a better understanding of our goals
can at least fend off future damage. As for specific solutions following recognition of dual
goals, one is to embrace a return to the Canons. Another might be to beef up and make
mandatory more of the broadly ethical project. Lastly, bar regulators might abandon any
attempt to address the broadly ethical.
236. A welcome addition to the input of the profession would be some meaningful role
for the public at large. Deborah Rhode has long argued that the lack of public
involvement in the drafting of lawyer regulations has increased their self-serving nature.
See RHODE, INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 208.
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practice of law. Many of these principles are already to be found in
the abandoned text of the Canons and Code, and others could be
added. 37 It is also likely that much of the substance of the
practical/minimum standards would also be retained, but in
connection with their broader purposes rather than as free standing
regulation.
Other commentators have similarly suggested a common law of
legal ethics,238 or a rethinking of our approach to legal ethics based
upon a broader conception of the meaning of lawyering.239 This
solution is both more modest and more radical. It is modest because
it does not make any specific claims about the content, methods, or
ends of the profession's ethical deliberations. It is more radical
because it suggests a rethinking of the entire project of legal ethics
around a statement of shared ethical values, requiring an
abandonment of our current regulatory focus on clarity and
enforceability.
This broader solution explicitly rejoins the moral with the
regulatory, and would require a reconsideration based explicitly on
shared ethical ground, working from the general to the specific and
from the ethical to the practical. The resulting standards would be
easier to understand and more likely to be followed. The current
Rules, by contrast, have worked backwards, continuously retreating
from any moral baseline in favor of greater amoral specificity.
The most obvious objection to this suggestion is that there will be
"no there there," i.e., the modern legal profession has insufficient
shared values to meet the task.240 In contrast to the ever-increasing
237. One such norm might be the elimination of discrimination within the profession.
The Minnesota Bar requires its members to attend mandatory "elimination of bias" CLEs
to "educate attorneys to identify and eliminate from the legal profession and from the
practice of law, biases against persons because of race, gender, economic status, creed,
color, religion, national origin, disability, age or sexual orientation." See Kari M. Dahlin,
Note, Actions Speak Louder than Thoughts: The Constitutionally Questionable Reach of
the Minnesota CLE Elimination of Bias Requirement, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1725, 1725 (2000)
(quoting the announcement of the Minnesota Supreme Court).
238. See Feldman, supra note 43, at 945-46.
239. The big three in this area are Deborah Rhode, William Simon and David Luban,
see RHODE, INTERESTS, supra note 3; SIMON, supra note 9; LUBAN, supra note 38,
although others have joined the fray. See Samuel J. Levine, Taking Ethical Discretion
Seriously: Ethical Deliberation as Ethical Obligation, 37 IND. L. REV. 21, 46-61 (2003)
(arguing that professional responsibility should require lawyers to perform some
meaningful ethical deliberation); Strassberg, supra note 102, at 934 (applying Ronald
Dworkin's "interpretive integrity" thesis to legal ethics).
240. See Rhode, Opening Remarks, supra note 12, at 459 (arguing that "whatever
consensus exists about professionalism at the symbolic level often fades when concrete
practices or sanctions are at issue"); Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil
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diversity of our current profession, the drafters of the Canons were
lawyers of remarkably similar backgrounds and practices.241
Nevertheless, I think this objection overstates the challenges involved
in finding common ground and understates the profession's shared
moral ground.242 While the legal profession has certainly diversified
in every possible measure (including by gender, race, religion, areas
of practice, and political philosophy), much of the moral content of
the Canons and Code would certainly still garner support, and other
shared norms might also be added.243
Others may argue that the original Canons themselves were
heavily based in self-serving economic protectionism, and even
Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 675,691 (1997) ("There is reason to question whether there is any longer a 'legal
profession,' if by that term one means a group of trained individuals pursuing a set of
common goals and united, even if loosely, by shared values."); Robert L. Nelson & David
M. Trubek, New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Legal Profession, in
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES 14 (David M. Trubek et al. eds., 1993)
(positing that professionalism relies on "vague and general invocation of 'shared' values
that really aren't shared"); Paul R. Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers, and the Values
of Casuistry, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 681 (2002) (noting the " 'moral diversity' of the legal
profession and the absence of shared values among lawyers."). Cf Ted Schneyer, Some
Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 13 (1990) (suggesting that the
"personal values" of most lawyers correspond with ordinary or common morality).
Moreover, some of our shared values may be undesirable. See W. Bradley Wendel,
Informal Methods of Enhancing the Accountability of Lawyers, 54 S.C. L. REV. 967, 981
(2003) (noting that some of the legal profession's "shared values might not be the values
we should cultivate among lawyers").
241. See Carle, supra note 63, at 34-39 (listing extensive background information on
the white, male, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant drafters of the Canons).
242. Professors Dwight Aarons and Chris Sagers raised serious objections to my
analysis here, with Professor Aarons going so far as to suggest that our visions of human
nature may be so diametrically opposed that we should just agree to disagree. While I
agree that it is easier to create broad maxims based on a common religion and
background, I simply disagree that a set of broad principles governing lawyer behavior
would be impossible to draft. Consider, for example, the work of drafting new
constitutions in South Africa or the European Union. See generally Griinne de Barca,
The Drafting of a Constitution for the European Union: Europe's Madisonian Moment or
a Moment of Madness?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 555 (2004) (describing the ongoing
drafting process in the European Union); Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutionalizing
Democracy in Fractured Societies, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1861, 1870-83 (2004) (describing the
South African experience of constitution drafting). If those documents can be drafted
against the historical and cultural backgrounds involved, a new set of Canons is not
impossible.
243. This objection also verges so closely on the nihilistic as to undercut virtually any
approach to lawyer regulation. If we cannot agree at all on the basic principles governing
the practice of law, there is no hope that we can ever create any meaningful regulation of
the profession because under this argument there is no profession to govern, just a group of
people bound together by a government license and nothing else.
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conscious or unconscious racism. 4  Economic self-protection,
however, is endemic to each of the ABA's statements of legal
ethics,245 and as long as lawyers dominate the drafting process, will
remain so. The charge of institutional racism is more worrisome, but
an inclusive drafting process would hopefully limit any economic or
racial bias.
Others might object to the goal of seeking broader ethical advice
for lawyers. Critics have referred to the Canons themselves as
"empty exhortations ' '246 and "pious homilies. '247  I am generally
underwhelmed by this objection. As a general rule, I would much
prefer to read even empty platitudes-although I prefer the term
"uplifting exhortation"-than the narrow hair-splitting and amoral
"ethics" of the current Rules.
The real grist of the above objection, and the main reason the
Canons were abandoned, is that a statement of general principles
cannot be enforced as a minimum standard of legal behavior and will
not offer guidance to practicing lawyers.2 48  In fact, critics of this
Article will likely claim that the two goals identified-the minimalist
and broadly ethical-were inherently at odds under the Canons and
would again be under my proposed reformulation. It is
unquestionably true that the application of the Canons to specific
instances of misconduct brought the tension between enforcement
and exhortation into stark focus. Nevertheless, given the current
244. See Barton, supra note 25, at 1194 (noting that the adoption of the Canons, among
other regulatory acts, can be seen as an economic "battle between the 'upper' bar (white
middle-class males) and the 'lower,' entrepreneurial bar (immigrants and minorities that
had to struggle for business)"). See also AUERBACH, supra note 62, at 40-45 (decrying the
Canons, and particularly their treatment of contingent fees, as economically and racially
motivated); Alfred L. Brophy, Race Class, and the Regulation of the Legal Profession in
the Progressive Era: The Case of the 1908 Canons, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 607,
607-22 (2003) (same).
245. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 26, at 432.
246. See W. Bradley Wendel, Morality, Motivation, and the Professionalism Movement,
52 S.C. L. REV. 557, 575 (2001).
247. See Patterson, supra note 96, at 639; see also John F. Sutton, Jr., Re-evaluation of
the Canons of Professional Ethics: A Reviser's Viewpoint, 33 TENN. L. REV. 132 (1966)
(asserting that many lawyers criticized the canons as pious, precatory statements
concerning manners and virtue).
248. See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More
Effective Regulation of Lawyers' Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 313, 325-26 & n. 51
(2002) (arguing that the "vague ABA Canons ... left open so many questions that lawyers
often needed greater guidance beyond the minimal language of the text"); Moore, Lawyer
Ethics Codes Drafting, supra note 11, at 926 & n.21 (stating that the Canons were rejected
because they "were incomplete, ambiguous, impractical for enforcement, insufficient as a
guiding and teaching tool, and not up to the challenges of a more complex legal
community and society").
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sorry state of disciplinary enforcement the "capacity for
enforcement" objection is quite ironic. Since only the most serious
misconduct currently results in discipline, we have little to lose
enforcement-wise by moving to a less specific set of guidelines. 49
It is also interesting to note that both the drafters of the Code
and the Rules stated explicitly that their reformulations of the
minimum required conduct did little to change the underlying
substantive law. 50 In other words, the categories of lawyer behavior
that were barred or mandated under the Canons did not change
significantly under the Code or the Rules. If the drafters were correct
on the substantive law, this admission contradicts the idea that the
Canons were unworkable or unenforceable. To the contrary, the
Canons set the baselines that were later adopted and sharpened by
both the Code and the Rules. 1
A lack of guidance is a more substantial question, but not a
showstopper. First, it is ironic for the same lawyers who expect the
public at large to structure their behavior around the vague iterations
of the negligence standard (among other amorphous legal standards)
to complain of a lack of guidance in legal ethics.252 If there is any
group of people in America who should be equipped to operate
under a loose, common law set of guidelines it should be the legal
249. One of my readers asked me to delineate how I could "ensure" compliance or
enforcement of a regulatory scheme based on the Canons. Currently only the most
obvious and egregious misconduct results in disbarment or suspension. See supra note 130
and accompanying text. This sort of misconduct will be punished under virtually any
regulatory scheme, so realistically speaking, a Canons based system would likely at last
equal (if not surpass) the current levels of enforcement. Logistically speaking, I would
expect that the mechanisms of enforcement (informal reputational effects, bar complaints,
court disciplinary systems, and malpractice actions) would likely remain the same, only the
substantive law applied would change.
However, selective enforcement or politically motivated punishment may prove
more prevalent under a broader standard. Cf. WOLFRAM, supra note 73, at 86 (arguing
that this was an occasional problem under the Canons); Morgan, supra note 37, at 419 &
n.23 (citing example of politically motivated bar admission refusal). Yet, selective
enforcement is certainly also a possibility under the Rules, and after In re Ruffalo, 390
U.S. 544 (1968), any accused would have at least the minimum due process and
constitutional protections available in a quasi-criminal proceeding. Id. at 550-51.
250. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
251. See Hazard, supra note 73, at 1246-49; Hodes, supra note 100, at 743-44; Gaetke,
supra note 100, at 63-71.
252. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 88-103 (Mark
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1881) (arguing that the negligence standard is too vague to
properly guide conduct); Frank B. Cross, America The Adversarial, 89 VA. L. REV. 189,
208 (2003) (reviewing ROBERT A. KAGAN, AMERICAN ADVERSARIALISM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001)) ("Concepts such as negligence and the reasonable
person standard are vague.").
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profession.
Second, even after almost a century's effort at narrowing the
standards that govern lawyer behavior, there are still regular
complaints that the Rules are too vague," or not specifically suited to
a certain type of practice. 254 This may just be an eternal complaint-
regardless of the level of specificity there will always be unseen
situations and uncertain applications.
Third, when courts and lawyer regulators analyzed the original
Canons they used the broad as an interpretive aid in determining the
narrow, and a substantial common law of legal ethics grew up through
court decisions and the work of ethics committees. These
interpretations of the Canons themselves yielded the great bulk of the
law underlying the Rules and the Code,255 it just appeared in a
different form, with the specific mixed in with the general. While the
Canons required more thought from lawyers, there is little evidence
that lawyers were disciplined excessively under the Canon's more
vague standards, or for unforeseen reasons.256 Further, with the
application of the Due Process Clause to lawyer disciplinary
proceedings in Ruffalo and companion cases there is a constitutional
baseline protection against punishment without adequate notice or
specificity.257
Lastly, increasing uncertainty might actually help compliance. 58
253. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 73, at 87 (arguing that "if anything is clear, it is
that many provisions of the lawyer codes are plainly imprecise."); Levine, supra note 93, at
538-45 (noting the existence of vague Rules and defending them).
254. See, e.g., Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform
Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45, 49 (1998) ("Bankruptcy
needs its own ethics code."); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of Professional
Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149, 149-50 (1993) (asserting
that additional ethical codes are necessary for non-litigators); cf Neuner, supra note 112,
at 2051 & n.47 (listing "specialty" codes adopted by narrower portions of the bar to
address specialized interests).
255. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (noting that the substantive law
governing lawyers changer very little for the Canons through the Code to the Rules).
256. Cf DRINKER, supra note 53 (listing relatively limited interpretations of the
Canons).
257. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968). See also Wilburn Brewer, Jr., Due Process in
Lawyer Disciplinary Cases: From the Cradle to the Grave, 42 S.C. L. REV. 927, 927 (1991)
(discussing parameters of due process requirements in disciplinary proceedings); Hazard
& Beard, supra note 144, at 1065 (describing parameters of due process clause
requirements for disciplinary proceedings).
258. Professor Fred Zacharias has argued that lawyer regulations should be created
along a specificity continuum, from broad to specific, depending on the goals of the
regulation, and the importance of roles and introspection. See Fred C. Zacharias,
Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of
Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 239-49 (1993).
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Broader, common sense standards of conduct would be easier to
remember, and overlap more with commonly held morality, making
compliance a matter of conscience as well as of legal sanction. The
thought process involved in analyzing the standards of conduct would
also differ greatly from the narrow boundary-seeking heuristic
triggered by black letter Rules and would more closely parallel
authentic ethical deliberation. 9
In fact, the problem with narrow rules may be that they offer too
much guidance."6 When faced with a fuzzy standard, a risk averse
actor will err on the safe side and avoid even potentially lawful
behavior. 6' While in many contexts a broad standard may have an
unwelcome chilling effect,262 in an area like legal ethics we may
259. See Feldman, supra note 43, at 945-46. Many lawyers would still naturally seek
boundaries, but the applicable heuristic would be the analysis of common law rules, a
synthesis of law, policy, and precedents, instead of the strictly linguistic and logical
heuristic of boundary finding for black letter rules.
260. See Paul G. Mahoney, Chris W. Sanchirico, General and Specific Rules (2004)
(arguing that more general rules may lessen the effects of agency capture) (draft on file
with author).
261. See Judith L. Maute, Sporting Theory of Justice: Taming Adversarial Zeal with a
Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. REV. 7, 27-28 (1987) (defending the use of broad
standards for litigation sanctions because "[iun time, the higher standards of
reasonableness and good faith enforced by court rules, like other areas of law, will be
largely self-executing, in that most risk averse rational players will comply voluntarily on a
regular basis."); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 385 (1985)
("Because standards do not draw a sharp line between permissible and impermissible
conduct, some risk averse people will be chilled from engaging in desirable or permissible
activities."). This argument about the efficacy of a broad standard versus a narrow rule
has been played out ad infinitum in the rules/standards literature. For a representative
sample, see generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN
LIFE (1991) (presenting a philosophical treatment of the rules/standards division); Joseph
R. Grodin, Are Rules Really Better than Standards?, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 569 (1994) (arguing
the pro-standards side); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175 (1979) (arguing for the general efficacy of black letter rules). The dichotomy
has been applied in multiple areas of the law. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rules,
Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181, 231-51 (1996) (using
dichotomy to explicate payment systems); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557-623 (1992) (applying law and economics);
Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules Versus Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 30-43 (2000) (applying behavioral economics to the
rules/standards debate); Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1275,1276 (2002) (cyberlaw); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property
Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 580 (1988) (property law). Mary Daly has persuasively argued
that the legal ethics journey from the Canons to the Rules can be best understood as a
journey from fuzzier standards to stricter rules. See Daly, supra note 102, at 1124-34
(arguing that the transition from the Canons to the Code to the Rules has marked a
transition from standards to rules).
262. Consider Fredrick Schauer's persuasive argument against broad speech
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actually be interested in chilling even ambiguously unethical
behavior, rather than easing compliance right up against the line of
illegal/unacceptable conduct.263  As Kathleen Sullivan has noted
"bright-line rules allow the 'bad man' to engage in socially
unproductive behavior right up to the line; on a pessimistic view of
human nature, the chilling effect of standards can be a good thing.
26
In an area where judges and lawyers once expected the profession to
avoid even "the appearance of impropriety, '265 it may be better to
have broad standards chill a whole class of possibly unethical conduct.
prohibitions, their chilling effects, and the related void-for-vagueness doctrine. Frederick
Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L.
REV. 685, 685 (1978).
263. For an empirical study of the benefits of uncertainty in law in the context of
criminal sanctions, see Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An
Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443 (2004). For an argument that judicial
unwillingness to enforce broad standards in favor of strict statutory construction has
partially caused the crisis in corporate governance, see Richard Lavoie, Subverting the
Rule of Law: The Judiciary's Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV.
115 (2004).
264. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22, 63 (1992); see also Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, The Vagueness of Limits and
the Desired Distribution of Conducts, 32 CONN. L. REV. 451, 483 (2000) (defending vague
standards because they provide "customized compliance"). Lawyers may want to argue
that they are not "bad men" in the Holmesian sense, but most of the public would
certainly disagree. Cf W. William Hodes, Truthfulness and Honesty Among American
Lawyers: Perception, Reality, and the Professional Reform Initiative, 53 S.C. L. REV. 527,
527-30 (2002) (describing public perception that lawyers are particularly untrustworthy
and regularly practice "loophole lawyering").
265. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1981); ABA Comm. on
Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Ops. 49, 50 (1931), reprinted in ABA, OPINIONS OF
THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES WITH THE CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS ANNOTATED AND THE CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
ANNOTATED 134,137 (1947); see also ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
2 (1998) (ordering judges to "avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety"). For
a brief history of the "appearance of impropriety standard, see Peter W. Morgan, The
Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. REV. 593,
595-603 (1992). This standard is not without its detractors. See PETER W. MORGAN &
GLENN H. REYNOLDS, THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY: HOW THE ETHICS WARS
HAVE UNDERMINED AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND SOCIETY (1997)
(arguing that the standard is harmful in bureaucratic enforcement of ethics rules); Edward
C. Brewer, III, Some Thoughts on the Process of Making Ethics Rules, Including How to
Make the "Appearance of Impropriety" Disappear, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 321, 328-29 (2003);
Levine, supra note 93, at 535-36 (summarizing criticisms of the standard in the legal ethics
context). This standard also enjoys support. See Cardona v. Gen. Motors Corp., 942 F.
Supp. 968, 975 (D.N.J. 1996) (defending the "much maligned" doctrine); Lovell v.
Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky. 1997) ("Even though the comment to Rule 1.9
specifically rejects the 'appearance of impropriety' standard ... the appearance of
impropriety is still a useful guide for ethical decisions."); Ann McBride, Ethics in
Congress: Agenda and Action, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 474-76 (1990) (arguing in
favor of strengthening the appearance of impropriety standard).
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CONCLUSION
The seeds of this Article, and my overall interest in the field of
legal ethics, were actually sewn the very first time I sat down to read
the Rules of Profes'sional Conduct. Fall semester of my third year in
law school, I enrolled in Michigan's two credit Legal Ethics class
because it was required for graduation. When I bought my books for
the semester, I dutifully bought a compendium of ethics rules and, on
a whim, sat down and read the Rules of Professional Conduct. I was
immediately struck by how little they said. The next day I attended
the first day of class and was greeted by an Adjunct Professor who
immediately bombarded the class with a series of war stories and
challenged us to apply the applicable Rules to his stories from
practice. 66 Ten minutes into class I was consulting my class schedule
and discovered that I could satisfy my ethics requirement by taking
one of the law school's clinics. Immediately after class I signed up for
the Child Advocacy Clinic and never saw the Adjunct Professor
again. Nevertheless, the fruitlessness of the entire enterprise stuck
with me. The Rules were so banal and seemingly useless. The class
was supposed to teach us something about ethics, but it would
apparently be little more than sitting through a series of hypotheticals
and mechanically applying the Rules of Professional Conduct.
My very first impressions of the two goals and the
professionalism movement stuck with me, and I have now come to
think that much of what the bar, legal academia, and lawyer
regulators have to offer lawyers is deeply misguided and actually
harmful. But, I have tried resolutely not to fall into full-metal
cynicism because my initial reaction was also tinged with sadness for
the loss of possibilities. There is so much that could be, and should
be, done within the field of legal ethics. Finding the will, the spirit,
and the integrity, as well as the clarity of vision to recognize what we
are doing and why will be difficult (impossible?) but that does not
mean that we should not try.
266. Note that this description perfectly matches the relative unimportance of the legal
ethics curriculum in many law schools. See RHODE, INTERESTS, supra note 3, at 200-03.
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